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‰¯·ÁÂ ‰ÏÎÏÎÏ ˙ÈÎÂ˙‰ Abstract 
This paper examines the socio-economic situation of the Arab-Bedouin population in 
the Negev, comparing it to that of the general Arab population in Israel. Poverty 
incidence in the last decade increased gradually. In 2004, the rate of poor individuals 
was 52%, nearly two thirds of which were persistently poor.  
 
By virtue of a unique database of the GS we can learn for the first time about the dire 
situation among Arab-Bedouin in the villages not recognized by the Israeli 
government. Poverty incidence was nearly 80% in 2004, and its severity was about 7 
times higher than that prevailing in the secular Jewish society. We discuss the Arabs’ 
access to public infrastructure and its effect on education and poverty, including the 
indirect effect through women’s education on the family’s fertility decision. 
Infrastructure includes public transportation, electricity systems, water and sewage, 
garbage disposal services, public health and education.   
 
Similarly to international poverty research, our findings show that personal and family 
traits, such as education, age, family size, employment and occupation of the head of 
the household, as well as the number of income earners in the family are important 
determinants of an Arab family’s probability to live in poverty. In the area of 
education, a salient process of improvement was found in rates of student enrollment 
over different generations, especially among women. Gaps in enrollment rates 
between men and women were reduced in favor of women. In the area of 
infrastructure we found a significant discrimination in the households’ access. The 
Bedouin’ access to infrastructure, especially in non-recognized villages, is so low that 
it forms a significant barrier to women’s participation in the labor force, thus reducing 
the number of income earners in the household. The deficient access to infrastructure 
was also found to have an adverse effect toward the completion of studies in schools 
and thus indirectly on the mothers’ childbirth decisions. This impediment to 
investment in human capital has moderated the leverage of positive influence that the 
education of women could have had on poverty. An additional finding is that among a 
large number of Arab academics, employment does not suit their skills, probably as a 
result of discrimination and segregation in the labor market. Combined and intense 
government intervention in infrastructure is expected to yield a high social return and 
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 A Introduction 
 
The purpose of this paper is to describe the socio-economic situation of the Arab-
Bedouin society of the Negev on the background of the general Arab society in Israel. 
We use a unique database of the Galilee Society (henceforth GS) that for the first time 
enables to view characteristics of Bedouin villages which are not recognized by the 
government, as well as Central Bureau of Statistics data (henceforth CBS).     
 
The way of life in the Arab-Bedouin society is undergoing accelerated change from a 
traditional agrarian society into a modern society. This change partly expresses the 
desire of youths in a traditional society to adapt to Western surroundings, and in part 
reflects a policy induced by the government. Following the uprooting of Bedouin 
villages after the war of 1948 from the North-Western region of the Negev to its 
North-Eastern region, a traumatic and complicated land dispute arose between the 
Bedouin and the State, which has led the State to turn its back on the most basic 
infrastructure required for the Bedouin such as water, electricity, education, sewage, 
garbage disposal, road systems, transportation, and employment infrastructure. Even 
in the few cases in which the government conceded to recognize a 'non-recognized' 
village within its existing borders (e.g. Um-Batin in 2004) and develop infrastructure 
therein, the process became entangled, among other things, in the thicket of 
conflicting interests within the Arab-Bedouin community. Hence, the inferior 
economic situation, which manifests in extremely high poverty incidence, is a 
combined result dictated by the dispute with the State, and intensified by tensions 
within the Arab-Bedouin society. This state of affairs impedes social development in 
that region and prevents any significant private investments in it.  
 
Past efforts to resolve the problems between Bedouin and government have failed. 
The confidence of the Bedouin in the government's ability to provide adequate public 
services is at a low. The government is frustrated with efforts to enforce building-laws 
over the land in dispute. This perpetual deadlock has led to recurring episodes of  
makeshift houses being built by Bedouin and to be demolished rapidly thereafter by 
the State, while no incentive, meaningful enough, is being created for Bedouin of the 
non-recognized villages to relocate into permanent communities recognized by the 
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caused ever increasing alienation towards the state. This failure spells loss for both 
parties to the dispute: it enhances the social and economic distress of the Bedouin 
population, while government sovereignty over territories in dispute is weakened. 
This predicament is deplorable for the Bedouin and for Israeli society in general.     
 
An attempt has been made in 2006 to mediate between the relevant agents with the 
assistance of the American Consensus Building Institute.
1 This initiative was designed 
as a pilot aimed at outlining a solution to the dispute and to the adversity in the 
villages Kuseife and Um-Batin, in the hope that a successful process may create a 
model for a cooperative solution to the problem. Another plan, called "Southward" 
(“Daroma” in Hebrew), aimed at developing the Negev, which is led by private Israeli 
investors, may favorably influence the entire Negev, including the situation of the 
Bedouin of the South, although according to Swirski (2007), the benefit for the 
Bedouin is not obvious. Usually, a process of urbanization is expected to reduce 
poverty. Indeed, the urbanization of the Bedouin in the seven recognized communities 
brought with it a system of basic services that includes a road system, schools, clinics, 
and water systems, but the level of services remained significantly inferior to that 
provided in Jewish communities of similar size. The provision of public services is 
complicated by the combined responsibility of the central and local government. The 
recognized Bedouin communities are rated at the bottom of the socio-economic scale 
published annually by the CBS.       
 
One might expect that urbanization would create a wider array of employment 
opportunities than the traditional occupations, and that it would raise the rate of 
employment among Arab-Bedouin. Such a process did not happen on a large scale, as 
may be seen from the low rates of participation in the labor force, particularly of 
women and also of men (8.7 and 55.4% respectively in 2004). The lack of adequate 
infrastructure, particularly of public transportation within Arab communities in 
general, within Bedouin communities in particular, and between them and Jewish 
                                                 
1 See the Conflict Evaluation Report (2006) of the CBI Institute, which is allied with the universities of 
Harvard and MIT. The preliminary report by the Institute focused on outlining the positions of groups 
of interested parties concerning the villages of Kuseife and Um-Batin. Delegates of the Bedouin public 
in both villages, of the government, and of additional interest groups were required to return a 
questionnaire concerning the main points of controversy, the problems that require attention, and their 
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communities that offer employment potential, also explains the low rates of 
participation of these population groups in the labor force. 
 
More than half of the Arabs live in poverty. The same data include not only the 
population of recognized Bedouin communities, but that of the non-recognized 
villages as well, records of which the CBS does not collect. The GS database enables 
research into the living conditions of the various Arab communities and allows for 
distinguishing between competing concepts of poverty.  
 
In the literature on poverty there is an ongoing discussion concerning alternative 
approaches to measuring poverty.
2 Some authors distinguish between the absolute and 
the relative approach to poverty measurement, but one might wish to distinguish 
between the approach of basic needs, which encompasses both the absolute (i.e. 
anchored) approach with a basket in the base year, updated only by the relevant price 
increase, and relative approaches, focusing on the basic needs as reflected in 
consumer expenditure survey data. This includes for example the Food Energy Intake 
and Share approach (FES), the National Research Council approach (NRC, also 
referred to as National Academy of Science, NAS, the Market Basket Measure 
approach, MBM, which are described in section C). The main, more common use of 
the relative approach is typically based on the median income, and sometimes on the 
average income. In Israel, similarly to many advanced countries and the OECD, the 
half-median income approach is used as the official poverty measure.
3 Still another 
group of relative indices are based on approaches of social deprivation and social 
exclusion. These indices relate to various indicators of the living standard in a 
relevant social environment. They might be based on subjective poverty perception. 
Many of them evolved around A.K. Sen’s capabilities approach (Sen, 1985), which 
views poverty in a multi-dimensional setting, rather than being restricted only to the 
analysis of (pecuniary) income and consumption data.
4 
 
                                                 
2 See Ehrenpreis, 2006, for an exhaustive and non-technical review. For aspects particularly relevant to 
the discussion for the situation in Israel see also Chapter 2 of the reports of the National Insurance 
Institute in recent years, and Chapter 8 of the Bank of Israel Report in years 2005 and 2006. 
3 See www.btl.gov.il/English%20Homepage/Publications/Poverty_Report and 
http://www.btl.gov.il/English%20Homepage/Publications/Annual%20Surveys%5CPages/skira%20200
7.aspx  
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In light of the above, this paper describes the socio-economic situation of the Arab-
Bedouin society on the background of the socio-economic situation of general Arab 
society in Israel, while focusing on poverty under various definitions, especially in the 
non-recognized villages, the conditions of which have been neglected in official 
poverty accounts. In section B we briefly review the historical background of the 
land-dispute between the Bedouin and the State. In section C, poverty is analyzed 
under various approaches to poverty measurement. In section  D we present an 
empirical analysis of the main determinants of poverty in the Arab-Israeli society. The 
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B Historical  Background   
 
Before the establishment of the State of Israel, the Bedouin population of the Negev 
counted, according to various estimates, 65,000 to 100,000 individuals. The absolute 
majority settled in the fertile North-Western region of the Negev (Falah, 1989).  Most 
Bedouin residents in this region fled or were expulsed during the war of 1948. Some 
became refugees in Gaza, the West Bank, or in neighboring Arab countries. 
According to various estimates, 11,000 to 17,000 individuals (Porat, 1998) remained 
in Israel. Most of the remaining Bedouin were uprooted from their living area in the 
Negev's North-West and relocated to its North-East region, referred to as ‘the border 
area’, also mentioned as ‘Siyagh’ or ‘Sayej’. These residents joined the tribes that 
used to live in this region before the establishment of the State and formed the basis of 
the non-recognized villages. According to Swirski and Hasson, 2006, this area spreads 
over 1.2 to 1.5 million dunams, of which about 400 thousand dunams were arable at 
the time, about a fifth of the arable land that the Bedouin cultivated before 1948. Porat 
(2000) estimates the area at two million dunams, while Ghazi Falah (quoted in Porat, 
1998) estimated the area at 2.7 million dunams. Thereafter, the Western region was 
expropriated under the Absentee Property Law of 1950, and the region was declared a 
closed military area from which the Bedouin were restricted. Bedouin residents were 
consequently prevented from living and making use of the land outside the ‘Border 
Area’. Until the termination of military rule in 1966, Bedouin, like the rest of the 
Israeli-Arab population, needed a special permit to move outside the area designated 
for them, for work, study or any other purpose.
5 
 
In 1953 the "Land Acquisition Law – Confirmation of Actions and Compensations" 
came into effect. Under that law compensation is due to anyone whose land is 
expropriated by the State. Expropriated lands were transferred to a government 
development authority and from it to the possession of the State's Settling Authority. 
Further along, parts of their lands were expropriated in the ‘Border Area’ for the 
purpose of establishing seven Bedouin settlements and for general development 
purposes (including Jewish communities and defense projects).         
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The Supreme Court (Civil Appeal 218/74) ruled in 1984 that the Negev is State land, 
and thus on the basis of the Lands Ordinance from the year 1858, installed by the 
Ottoman regime, and the following British Ordinance concerning the same topic.
6 
Bedouin land claimants relied on the rules of tradition and did not care to obtain title 
deeds from Ottoman or British authorities, inter alia, due to apprehension of having to 
pay taxes. In 1962 a government committee recommended the establishment of 
permanent communities for Bedouin over an area of 7,600 dunam in the Border Area. 
In 1965 the government approved three sites on which to establish the communities – 
close to Beer Sheva, Shoval, and Kuseife. The first community, Tel Sheva, was 
established in 1969, Rahat in 1971, Segev Shalom in 1979. Ar'ara and Kuseife were 
established in 1982, Lakiya and Hura in the second half of the 1980's. These 
communities were designed without consulting the Bedouin residents or accounting 
for their special needs. Al-Huzayel (2004) argues that the purpose of the mentioned 
government decisions was to take control of Bedouin lands while restricting the area 
for Bedouin to the smallest possible area of ‘Border Area’ lands. A survey made in 
2001 by Abu-Saad and Lithwick in communities recognized by the State, indicated 
discontent with urban living conditions there, and distrust by residents toward the 
government and its conduct in relation to the land dispute.  
 
Alongside the effort to settle the Bedouin in urban communities, the government tried 
to exercise its formal title by evicting the Bedouin from the lands and relocating them 
to the aforesaid communities in return for compensation to the families. For that 
purpose the government created a mechanism for land settlement. The Bedouin who 
asserted title in lands were requested to file a claim and then sign a waiver in respect 
of the land being claimed in return for compensation by the State. Those who did not 
assert title and conceded to relocation to one of the communities, the State offered a 
plot of land. In 1969 the Ministry of Justice had set a mechanism for land settlement 
under which anyone who asserts title in land may file a claim with the land settlement 
                                                 
6 The Ottoman Ordinance regarded uncultivated lands as "dead" lands ("Mawwat" in Arabic). The 
Ordinance prescribed that one who cultivates lands can register them in one's name, while the State 
retains the principal title. In 1921 the British Mandate government published a Lands Ordinance based 
on the Ottoman Lands Ordinance. The British Ordinance allowed people who cultivate "Mawwat 
Lands" to register the lands in their name. One who did not register the lands lost his right to the title. 
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officer.
7 3,000 title claims were filed, asserting title over 991 thousand dunam, most 
during the 1970's. The government had since reached settlements in respect of 140 
thousand dunam. Hence, the process remains incomplete for an estimated 850 
thousand dunam, due to disagreement over the rate of compensation and living 
conditions in the recognized communities, which some of the Bedouin regard as an 
unsuitable alternative to their living conditions in the non-recognized villages, and 
due to the denial of a traditional way of life, including traditional sources of income, 
and the lack of any employment infrastructure in the recognized communities.    
 
The refusal of many Bedouin land claimants to accept stipulations made in the 
government's offer has led to the enactment of a law which was intended to force a 
settlement upon those who thus far refused the offers.
8 In Tel Malhata (Tel almalh), 
the "Peace Law" was later effected in slightly improved conditions.
9 Due to continued 
uncertainty from the government’s point of view, it froze most areas of public policy 
and infrastructure investment. This led to a lack of clarity toward the future and as a 
consequence prevented also private initiative and investment in these places. Even in 
cases where approved urban planning schemes existed, they were not implemented in 
many cases, sometimes also due to conflicts within the Arab-Bedouin society 
concerning title and use of lands by other Bedouin residents.   
    
In 1986 The Administration for the Promotion of Bedouin ("The Bedouin 
Administration") was established as part of the Israel Land Administration in purpose 
of negotiating with Bedouin residents who filed title claims in respect of lands. 
Notwithstanding, the administration defines its functions in a much broader sense: 
planning and development in existing Bedouin communities, and planning of new 
communities pursuant to government decisions, allotment of land for agriculture and 
building of public establishments, settling of agreements for relocating Bedouin from 
non-recognized communities to recognized ones, administration of the Committee for 
the Allocation of Drinking Water etc.. The multitude of functions in the hands of the 
                                                 
7 The State Comptroller, 2002, p. 115. 
8 Government resolution No. 179 [BD/1] dated November 18, 1979. 
9 Its formal name is the "Acquisition of Land in The Negev Law – The Peace Treaty with Egypt, 5740 
– 1980". Under this law, people who claimed lands in an extent of up to 100 dunam were offered to 
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Administration has created a situation, according to which various government offices 
parted with their responsibility to attend to residents in the ministries’ designated 
areas of responsibility, given the Bedouin Administration’s extensive assumption of 
responsibility over the fate of Bedouin residents, in all relevant aspects of public 
policy.
10 Yet the Administration finds it difficult to handle the many functions needed 
in the Bedouin communities, particularly in light of the ambiguity concerning its 
powers. The Administration is subject to three bodies at any given time – the Israel 
Land Administration, the Ministerial Committee for the Coordination of Policy and 
Operation in the Bedouin Sector, and the Ministry of National Infrastructure. The 
upshot is that in many areas of public policy the residents do not receive adequate 
services and the Administration neither has the vocational skills nor the resources 
required in order to provide adequate services. 
 
In 2004, the Arab population in Israel counted about 1,030,100 - 82% Muslims, 9% 
Christian, and the remaining 9% included Druze and other groups (Table 1). A fifth of 
the Muslim Arabs were Bedouin. Most of them (70.3%, including the Bedouin of the 
North) lived in recognized communities and in the South 59%. 
Table 1: The Arab Population in Israel by Population Group, 2004
1 
Population group   Persons  In % of total Arab population 
Total Arab population  1,030,100  100.0 
Muslims (in total)   847,967     82.3 
      Bedouin (in total)  180,146     17.5 
           Bedouin of the South  131,819     12.8 
                In recognized communities    78,404     7.6 
                In non-recognized      
                communities 
  53,415    5.2 
      Other Muslims   667,821   64.8 
Christians     91,403    8.9 
Druze and others     90,729    8.8 
1excludes East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights. 
Source of data: the Galilee Society, 2004. 
                                                 
10 See document by the Director of the Southern District of the Ministry of the Interior, Dudu Cohen, in 
2002. "The reality of the Administration for the Promotion of the Bedouin […], the Authority for 
Bedouin Education, the Welfare Department for the Bedouin in the Dispersion […] create a sentiment 
among the Bedouin of being an aberrant population […] which is not entitled to receive direct and 
professional service from the various government offices, as applied to the Jewish population […]. The 
Bedouin Administration could (and perhaps should) handle but a single area specific to the Bedouin 
sector, which is the area of title claims and land settlements. […] the question is posed whether its 
organizational emplacement should be with the Israel Land Administration, the Ministry of Justice or 
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C  Poverty in the Arab Society, with Attention to the Arab-Bedouin Society 
 
The socio-economic situation of the Arab population is difficult: the rate of 
unemployment is high, the employment ratio, as a share of the population at working 
age, is low, and dropout rates of children and youngsters from the education system is 
substantial. This and other factors described below cause severe and persistent 
poverty, particularly in non-recognized villages. Poverty severity, as measured by 
Sen’s Poverty-Index, deepened over the years. In 2004 their poverty incidence was 
79.2% (for persons), and for sake of comparison, the Sen Poverty-Index was 6.7 times 
that of the Israeli mainstream (Jewish non-orthodox) population.
11  
 
c.1  Various approaches to measuring poverty 
 
There is considerable professional consensus concerning the methods of aggregation 
and identification of the poor.
12 Poverty measures are often distinguished by reference 
to an absolute or a relative approach, typically on the basis of income or consumption 
expenditure, and more recently, drawing on multiple variables, reflecting a 
multidimensional approach. The most common poverty line for advanced countries is 
that of half-median income, as done for example by Israel’s National Insurance 
Institute (henceforth NII). The expenditure-based poverty line is often defined as a 
basket of expenditure on basic needs. This can be done in an absolute or a relative 
fashion. In the absolute approach the basket is anchored in a given base year and then 
updated each year only by the increase in prices.
 Such poverty measures suffer from 
arbitrariness concerning the choice of the base year and they become increasingly 
                                                 
11 We have selected the non-orthodox Jewish society as a reference group since poverty in the orthodox 
population is a singular phenomenon that requires separate reference. See also Gottlieb (2007). 
12 The issue of aggregation relates to the calculation of an index on the basis of specific information 
regarding poverty in households or individuals. The simplest aggregation method is to count the poor. 
This index, though widely used, ignores differences in the severity of poverty among families. In the 
professional literature various aggregation methods account for poverty severity such as the Sen-Index, 
its extention by Shorrocks (1995), the quadratic income-gap measure by Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke 
(1984) or the Watts Index (1968) to name but a few. The issue of identification deals with questions of 
"what is poverty” and "who is poor". The discussion about poverty lines relates to the first question 
while the discussion of income sources relates to the second. See also Sen and Foster, 1997, or 
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anachronistic with the time distance of the base year.
13 Poverty lines of relative basic 
needs baskets are set each year on the basis of the current relevant survey. Examples 
for this approach are the Canadian Market Basket Measure (MBM), the American 
National Academy of Science’s basket (NAC) and the increasingly used Food Energy 
Intake and Share Indices (FEI or FES) as described in Ravallion (1993,1994, 1998) 
and extensively discussed below. We leave out important other relative indices of 
social deprivation or social exclusion for future research, despite their attractiveness 
for poverty research.
14 They refer to various indicators of the living standard in a 
relevant social environment. Some of them are based on the approach of subjective 
poverty perception. Much of this literature has developed out of A.K. Sen’s 




In this paper poverty indices are calculated on the basis of the relative approach of the 
widely accepted half-median equivalent net financial income, practiced inter alia, by 
the NII
16 and on several definitions of the basic needs approach. The relative basic 
needs approach is presented here by two alternatives – the first is the NRC/MBM 
approach, combining principles of the National Academy of Science’s Research 
Council (NAS) and of the MBM initiated by the Canadian Ministry of Human 
Resources (MBM). An important difference between the FES and the NRC or MBM 
approach is the former’s reference to consumption data only, whereas the NRC and 
MBM approaches identify poor households by comparing basic needs to some 
definition of disposable income.
17  
 
                                                 
13 Thus, for example, year 1959 was selected to be the base year of the American anchored (absolute) 
index ("The Orshanski Index"). In Israel, such an absolute index is calculated by the Bank of Israel. It 
is based on year 1997, for the arbitrary reason of this being the first year in which surveys of incomes 
and expenditures were unified. 
14 See for example Townsend, 1962, Desai and Shah, 1988 or Saunders, 2003. 
15 See Deutsch and Silber, 2006. 
16 Equivalent income refers to the economies of scale (“savings”) in expenditures per individual with 
the increase in family size. Such economies of scale are mainly due to the indivisibility of capital that 
can be enjoyed by more than one person without infringing the use by other household members, such 
as the use of the kitchen by all family members etc. 
17 The NAS approach is thoroughly discussed in Citro and Michael, 1995. The MBM is described in 
Human Resources Development Canada, 2003. For a discussion concerning the principles for 
calculating the FES and its use in many countries around the globe, see Ravallion (1993, 1994, 1998) 
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A central difference between the current methods of basic needs and other relative 
methods such as the half- median income is in the extent of adjustment to the current 
standard of living. In the relative versions of basic consumption expenditure the extent 
of adjustment is significantly lower than in the relative income based approaches.
18  
 
c.1.a    The relative approach 
Calculations of the relative approach are based on the definition of the poverty line as 
half the median financial equivalent income, as calculated by the NII.
19 Application of 
the official poverty line to the data of the Galilee Society enables for the first time to 
assess poverty among the entire Arab population in Israel i.e. including Bedouin in 
non-recognized villages.
20 Alongside the advantages of being simple to measure and 
easy to compare internationally, the official NII relative financial measure suffers 
from the fact that income in kind, such as that derived from the family residing in its 
own home and caring for its small children by the spouse that stays at home, is 
ignored and creates an upward bias of poverty incidence. Another type of income in 
kind, not accounted for in this definition, refers to the benefits in kind that form part 
of government policy.
21 While all pros and cons of the various types of poverty 
measurement need to be weighed against each other it is clear that this difficulty 
narrows the sensitivity of the relative financial income poverty index to government 
policy aimed at reducing poverty, a fact that reduces its attractiveness as an indicator 
for an anti-poverty target. 
 
 
                                                 
18 See chart 4B in GM. 
19  The poverty line of the NII is set on the basis of half the median net financial income. The 
equivalence scale is based on the weight attributed to expenses on food in the family income, and it 
presumes less economies of scale than that of the OECD. Hence, the dimensions of poverty, especially 
in population groups with large families, such as in the Arab and Jewish-Orthodox societies, are higher 
according to the Israeli equivalence scale. 
20 Notice that since the CBS does not compile data regarding Bedouin in non-recognized villages (see 
below), it is reasonable to assume that the poverty line of half the median income in Israel would have 
turned out to be lower, had this population been included in the official calculation. Given the fact that 
most of this neglected population is extremely poor (see below) this would probably still raise poverty 
incidence for Israel. 
21 In theory such income is easy to include in the basic needs approach, but in practice such information 
is not available in Israel unlike in the US where there is a special survey for such information. As we 
shall see below, the Galilee Society has dedicated much effort to this issue pertaining to accessibility to 
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c.1.b  The relative methods of basic needs
22 
The NRC approach: the poverty line is set according to the 30
th to the 35
th percentile 
of two main product groups – food and non-food.
23 The non-food component is made 
up of accommodation, clothing, footwear, and an increment of miscellaneous personal 
expenses and expenses for transportation, which are approximated by a small 
multiplier. The NRC committee avoided the inclusion of medical expenses and 
expenses for education in the poverty line.
24 Gottlieb and Manor, 2005, (henceforth 
GM) included the average of out-of-pocket expense on health, not covered by health 
insurance. The sources of income addressing the question of "who is poor" include all 
incomes i.e. in contrast to the half- median approach, which typically restricts itself to 
net monetary income, the NRC/MBM also includes income in kind.
25 In order to 
calculate the net income disposable for the purchase of the basic basket, the share of 
private basic expenses on health is deducted from the total income derived from all 
sources, if they deviate in excess of the average private expense on health.
26 The cost 
of going out to work for couples with small children, where both spouses work (or of 
working single parent mothers), is also deducted in order to distinguish the poverty 
situation in families of this type in comparison to families with a similar level of 
financial income but in which one of the parents adds to the family’s living standard 
by taking care of the children. 
 
The MBM approach is similar to the NRC approach.
27 The difference between the 
two approaches is mainly that the expense on food in the MBM poverty line is set in a 
normative manner based on nutritional recommendations, while contemplating the 
                                                 
22 We do not present the absolute approach given the arbitrariness of its anchored living standard. 
23 The selection of percentiles 30 to 35 was made by the NRC committee, among other things, in 
reliance on family-budget research by Renwick and Bergmann (1993), which found expenses in these 
percentiles to represent about 80% of the median expenditure. Tests regarding the American economy 
showed such expenses to to fall into the range of 78 to 83 percent of the median. Calculations by 
Gottlieb and Manor (2005) for Israel in 1997 to 2002 yielded similar results. 
24 See Iceland (2005). 
25  Due to lack of detailed information regarding incomes in kind of public services, only private 
incomes in kind were included, mainly the non-cash income derived from accommodation in a 
privately owned apartment. 
26 Iceland (op.cit.), whose paper was published after GM suggested a similar calculation for the United 
States. 
27 The Canadian MBM uses percentiles 20 to 41 for non-food products. As far as income resources are 
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family's composition by age and gender.
28 The normative nature of the MBM food 
section is an advantage over its relativity in the NRC approach, since the state of 
information today allows quite accurate and environmentally coordinated assessment 
of basic food expenses.   
 
The FES approach, like the MBM approach, is also based on a basket of basic 
consumption expenditure that includes, among other things, the normative nutritional 
expense on food. The major difference between the FES approach and the NRC and 
MBM approaches lies in the method of determining the basic expense of "non-food" 
in the poverty line: while in the aforesaid approaches the determination of basic 
products and their quantification requires an administrative and quite arbitrary 
process, in the FES method the extent of expense on non-food is determined 
according to the preferences of families positioned at the juncture between poverty 
and non-poverty in the distribution of private consumption expenditure.  According to 
micro-economic theory, the relevant families’ consumption equilibrium implies 
equality of relative marginal utilities between food and non-food to the inverse of 
their price ratio. One may therefore conclude that if a family consumes a sufficient 
food basket, there is ground to believe that at such a microeconomic equilibrium the 
families also reach a similar level of efficiency in the consumption of non-food 
products. This method’s advantage is the lack of the need to itemize the composition 
of the basic non-food basket. The adjustment of the value of the non-food basket over 
time is consistent with consumers’ revealed preferences. In this sense, the approach is 
less patronizing.
29 An additional important difference of the FES approach compared 
to the other approaches is its sole focus on consumption expenditure without any 
reference to incomes. In other words, a household is considered poor if its 
consumption falls below the consumption-poverty line. This may be interpreted as an 
expression of persistent poverty.
30 Like the half- median approach, the FES is also 
                                                 
28 The Israeli food basket was calculated by the team of Nitsan-Kaluski at the Ministry of Health only 
for year 2002. GM calculated the recent years on the same basis while accounting for price inflation. 
29 We calculated the FES following the methodology described in appendix 1 of Ravallion (1994) and 
in Ravallion (1998, pp.17-18): The non-food part of the basic basket is calculated as an average of the 
"minimal" basket and the "maximum" basket: the minimum is approximated by the income or expense 
equal to the cost of the normative food basket and the maximum equals the expense on the family’s 
non-food consumption at which the family’s actual food expenditure equals the normative food 
expenditure. 
30  According to Milton Friedman’s permanent income hypothesis, a household seeks to smooth 
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simple to calculate. Despite it being a basic-needs approach it may be considered as a 
relative poverty measure, since it is based on current expenditure surveys. 
 
c.1.c  Problems of measuring poverty among the Bedouin 
c.1.c.1  Lacking representation of the Arab-Bedouin population in CBS data 
  
The CBS survey's samples do not represent the entire Arab population in Israel, since 
the Bedouin of the non-recognized villages do not appear in the CBS sampling 
procedure. This missing population in the CBS-sample accounts for some 40% of the 
Bedouin population in the South.
31 This is one of the advantages of the Galilee 
Society’s particular focus (over-sampling) on the socio-economic situation of 
residents in non-recognized villages.
32 An important conclusion toward improving the 
infrastructure of information pertaining to the social situation in Israel is to demand 
the inclusion of non-recognized Bedouin villages in the surveys of the CBS. This is 
particularly important considering the size and extent of poverty of this ignored 
population group. At present 40% the Bedouin population, many of whom are among 
the poorest of the poor in Israel, are not represented in official CBS social statistics. 
This ignorance made it easy for the consecutive governments in Israel to ignore the 
needs of this population. 
 
c.1.c.2  A comparison between samples of the CBS and the Galilee Society
33 
Following the statistical effort made by the GS there are currently two different 
databases concerning the socio-economic situation of Arabs in Israel – data of the 
                                                                                                                                             
families typically have less access to the capital market and thus to saving and dissaving. Their 
consumption will thus be more correlated with actual income, and therefore more prone to income 
variation. In contrast, the temporarily poor can continue with their routine consumption even when 
incomes drop unexpectedly. The FES might thus ignore the transient poor since their consumption is 
transitorily higher than their income which is below the poverty line. See also chapter 8 in the Bank of 
Israel Report, 2006. 
31 A few of those living adjacently to recognized communities might be included in the sample. 
32 While the number of Arab households in the income and expenditure surveys of the CBS in 2004 
was 1,858 and 646, respectively, the corresponding number in the Galilee Society’s survey was 2,680 
(exclusive of Bedouin in non-recognized villages). The number of households of non-recognized 
villages in their sample was 570   , reflecting over-sampling. 
33 While working on the Galilee Society database (2004) Gottlieb and Kachanovsky, 2007 compared 
the data, to the CBS expenditure survey for 2004. In addition, attention must be directed to the fact that 
in the Galilee Society database many observations are missing. We did not deviate from the common 
practice of setting them at zero, though it might create an upward bias on poverty. At this stage we 
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CBS and data of the GS. When we exclude the observations regarding the Bedouin of 
non-recognized villages from the GS samples, then the two databases should be 
comparable
34. We therefore compared the averages of several variables in the data, 
based on the samples after making them compatible. 
 
We examined the consistency of the two databases with the purpose of expanding the 
calculations of poverty in the GS database to other approaches beyond the accepted 
relative approach. 
Gottlieb and Kachanovsky found monetary income and food expenditure to be of high 
resemblance in the two data sources. Regarding the remaining non-food expenses the 
same will only apply if their accumulated amount derived from the GS database is 
similar to that in the CBS data. The comparison includes a t-test for the equality of 
means and a Levene (1960) test of equality of variances.
35  
c.2  The poverty situation among Arabs and its development in recent years 
 
Prior to engaging in measuring poverty on the basis of GS data, it is important to 
clarify a methodological problem concerning the calculation of the poverty estimate in 
this survey according to the NII poverty line: Given the NII’s reliance on CBS data 
only, its poverty line is calculated without reference to the Bedouin of non-recognized 
villages. Hence, the official poverty line has a certain upward bias, since the addition 
of families, mainly in the bottom sphere of the distribution of incomes, raises the 
position of the previous median family as compared to the “new” median family after 
including the non-recognized Bedouin. The poverty line will thus be lower than the 
official line. Poverty incidence is affected by two opposing effects: (1) some of the 
newly-added families who entered the bottom sphere of the incomes distribution will 
raise the headcount, and (2) the reduction of the poverty line will exclude some 
families that were previously considered poor. It seems that the net influence in the 
half-median approach is very small. In the FES approach, poverty increases at a rate 
of one percent point. Chart 1 below does not account for this effect.  
 
                                                 
34 The Galilee Society sample excludes the Arabs of Jerusalem. We thus excluded them from the CBS 
data as well. 




Poverty, Education, and Employment in the Arab-Bedouin Society                Suleiman Abu-Bader and Daniel Gottlieb    
16
Poverty among the Arab population is very high, especially in non-recognized 
villages: In 2004 the incidence of poverty in the non-recognized villages was 79.2% 
(individuals) and the Sen Index for the poverty severity was 70% higher than that of 
the general Arab population, and 6.7 times higher than that of the “mainstream” 
Jewish non-orthodox population. 
 
c.2.a  The poverty situation in 2004 (including non-recognized villages) 
Poverty in the Arab society is severe, and according to the relative approach in 2004 
more than half the Arab population lived in poverty. Chart 1 illustrates poverty 
calculations for the Arab population according to the half-median definition and the 
FES approach.
36 The Sen Index
37, which illustrates the severity of poverty, was 4.4 
times that of non-orthodox Jews. 
 
The poorest group according to the poverty incidence is that of the Bedouin in non-
recognized villages. The incidence of poverty in recognized villages is the second 
largest, even though the severity of poverty is lower than that of the remaining 
Muslim population. The lowest incidence of poverty among Arabs is that of 
Christians. Notwithstanding, its level is still more than double that of the non-
orthodox Jewish reference group. The severity of poverty among the Druze and 
Christians is more moderate than that of the Muslim population, and it is about 3 
times higher than that of the Jewish reference group.  
                                                 
36As mentioned above, the FES approach can be interpreted as reflecting persistent poverty, which by 
definition will typically be lower than total poverty, since part of the poor may be in temporary 
poverty.  Calculations of true persistent poverty require panel data on incomes and expenditures over 
time. Such data is not available in Israel. Here half-median persistent poverty is approximated by the 
headcount of individuals, for whom both income and consumption are below the official poverty line 
(see also the Bank of Israel’s Annual Report, 2006, chapter 8 and the NII’s poverty report for 2007). 
37 The Sen Index is defined as follows: H[I+(1+I)*Gp] while H stands for the incidence of poverty, I 
stands for the gap of incomes from the poverty line, and Gp  represents the Gini Index for inequality of 
incomes among the poor. Additional indices exist for the severity of poverty. An alternative index, well 
accepted in professional literature, is the FGT Index. This index expresses the weighted average of 
squared income gaps from the poverty line. There are other indices, such as the H.W. Watts Index of 
1968. A version for measuring the FGT for the definitions of multi-dimensional poverty was developed 
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Chart 1: The dimensions of poverty in the Arab society in Israel 
(The Half Median and Basic Consumption expenditure – FES - Approaches, 












































































* The top numbers (e.g. 0.425 for the non-recognized Bedouin) are values of the Sen-poverty index, the 
number just below (e.g. 6.7 for the non-recognized Bedouin) are the ratios of the Sen index relative to 
that of non-orthodox Jews. The numbers above the column (eg. 78) indicate the poverty incidence 
according to the specific poverty definition, except for the number above the column of “persistent 
poverty (half-median): that number represents the share among the poor of those, for whom not only 
income is below the poverty line, but also their consumption expenditure. 
 
c.2.b.  Poverty over time (excluding non-recognized villages)  
The severity of poverty in the Arab society is significantly higher (about 3 to 4 times) 
than that of the non-orthodox Jewish population. Over time there is an upward trend 
in the severity of poverty among Arabs.
 38 This conclusion applies to both the half-
median and the FES approaches. This result reflects a persistent process of a 
worsening of the standard of living during the observation period.   
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During the first years the severity of poverty fluctuated significantly according to the 
FES approach, stabilizing thereafter around the level of 0.13. 
 
Chart 2: Poverty severity (Sen) among Arabs by various poverty measures 




c2.c.  Poverty over time,  by regions (CBS Data) 
 
Through the period 1997-2006 severity of poverty increased over time as measured by 
the half-median approach and the basic needs approach of the NRC/MBM, as 
illustrated in Charts 3 and 4, among the general Arab population in Israel. According 
to the FES approach there seems to be a downward trend of persistent poverty in the 
South, though since it is accompanied by sizable fluctuations this result seems to be 
unstable. The severity of poverty according to this approach slightly increased, as 
illustrated in Chart 5, in both the Center and the North. Persistent poverty might 
include also newly poor people.
39 An upward trend in the severity of poverty is 
evident in all regions according to the half-median definition (Chart 3), and according 
                                                 
39 This is possible when the young generation of persistently poor families, who find it difficult to 
escape poverty, create new families. The likelihood of such a phenomenon probably increases inversely 
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to the two other indices the severity of poverty fluctuates around a fixed average or 
shows a downward trend (Charts 4 and 5). The substantial impact that developments 
in the north (due to its relative size) have on the overall result, dictates the overall 
trend. We conclude that the gaps between the regions suggest a need for affirmative 
economic policy in the South.  
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Chart 4: Poverty severity (Sen) by regions; NRC/MBM poverty measure 
 Source of data: CBS Income and consumption surveys for the years 1997 to 2006. 
 
Chart 5: Poverty severity (Sen) by regions; FES poverty measure 
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c.2.d.  Child poverty over time, by regions  
 
The trends of child poverty are similar in both the half-median approach and the basic 
needs approach. Among Arab children of the north the deterioration was dramatic 
since 1997: the incidence of poverty among them went up from 36% to 60% (Chart 
6). Among the children of the South, the deterioration occurred mainly in years 2002-
2004, concomitant with the sharp cutbacks in child allowances and the recession 
during the first part of the same period. According to this approach, it appears that 
subsequent growth did not manage to remedy the adverse impact.
40 Among Arab 
families in the Center of Israel a particularly acute deterioration occurred in 2006. The 
state of poverty among Arab children towards the end of the observation period 
(2006) is particularly bad: two thirds live in poverty (according to the relative 
approach). The phenomenon of a converging incidence of poverty in the three regions 
is salient, and instead of convergence taking a course of improvement toward the 
relatively low levels of the late 1990's, the situation in the North and in the Center has 
been deteriorating towards that of the South, which most of the time has been the 
poorest region. The implication of such high poverty among children is severe for the 
long-term: It perpetuates persistent poverty in the generation of the children, since 
decent education is an important determinant for the young generation’s capability to 
escape persistent poverty. The variety of alternative approaches to measuring poverty 
presented here emphasizes the interdependence between the choice of the poverty 
definition and the relationship between poverty and growth. It appears that growth had 
a moderating influence on poverty among children according to the definition of basic 
consumption expenditure of the NRC/MBM, and of the FES approach as well, while 
the relative approach, at most, indicates a moderation in the growth of the incidence 
of poverty. 
 
                                                 
40 One of the criticisms made against the relative approach pertains to its diminished sensitivity to 




Poverty, Education, and Employment in the Arab-Bedouin Society                Suleiman Abu-Bader and Daniel Gottlieb    
22




The source for the calculations: income surveys, the CBS; the data (concerning the South) do not 
include Bedouin of non-recognized villages.  
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D  Major Determinants of Poverty 
 
This section elaborates on the micro-economic factors affecting poverty, thus relating 
poverty to individual and family-decisions on the one hand, and to government policy 
in the sphere of public investment in infrastructure on the other. 
 
The size of the household is a standard determinant of the probability of living in 
poverty. This micro-economic effect is closely related to the effect of population on 
poverty at the macro level of the economy.
41 And still, it is common practice in 
standard poverty equations to include the size of the family (or alternatively the 
dependency ratio) as a central factor to explain the phenomenon of poverty.
42        
 
The purpose of this section  is to analyze the relationship between education and 
behavior in the labor market as they are reflected in the data of the GS. As mentioned 
earlier the influence of decisions in the realm of education affects the family’s long 
run poverty prospects. Furthermore, the government’s infrastructure policy in 
transportation, sanitation has a strong influence on the family’s microeconomic 
decision and thus on its probability of living in poverty.
43 
 
d.1 The  household  perspective 
 
The interest in the relationship between fertility and family size is well established 
(see Becker, 1965), in which such decisions are analyzed in a dynamic model. 
Dasgupta (1993) relates the decision concerning childbirth and family size with an 
additional important dimension not mentioned in the neoclassical model - namely the 
cultural consideration latent in fertility patterns practiced in traditional societies. In 
recent years the demand for education by women has been recognized to play an 
                                                 
41 See Ravallion (2005) for the effect of population growth   –   birth and mortality   –   on poverty. He  
distinguishes between direct and indirect influences and warns against a hasty conclusion regarding the 
treatment of fertility as part of government policy, while it does influence poverty. He stresses the 
simultaneity between poverty and fertility. Economic growth, for instance, may simultaneously 
influence the family's living standard and the decision pertaining to childbirth. In that sense at the 
micro-economic level the relationship between fertility and the probability of being poor may in part 
reflect a spurious correlation affected by an outside factor - growth. 
42 In the current empiric research (see below) this is not a problem since the database is cross section. 
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important role in the fertility decision in traditional societies which are in a process of 
gradual change toward the woman’s enhanced independence.
44   
 
d.1.a  Fertility and family size 
 
The age distribution among population groups of the Arab society in Israel reflects the 
differences in fertility between the various groups (Chart 8).  
 
The share of families with more than 7 persons is significantly higher among the 
Bedouin of the South, as compared to the three other groups (Christians, Druze, and 
non-Bedouin Muslims). Thus for example, nearly all families with more than 9 
persons are Bedouin. The smallest families are in the Christian society and the 
distribution of family size among the Druze and the non-Bedouin Muslims is quite 
similar. These differences are manifest in the age distribution in chart 9: thus for 
example, the share of children under the age of 5 among the Bedouin in the south is 
about 1.8 times that of the remainder of the non-Bedouin Arab society. Given the gaps 
in education, the differences in the rate of population growth emphasize persistent 
poverty. One way to counter this influence is by affirmative action in favor of the 
Arab-Bedouin population.  
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Chart 8: Distribution of families by size – different population groups 
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decades ago, quickly became available to almost all. The greatest leap in this respect 
is among the Bedouin. Its main achievement was the increase in the rate of school 
attendance in elementary school and junior high school, whereas at higher levels rates 
of school attendance are still lower, especially among the Bedouin of non-recognized 
villages (see Table 2 below). 
 
d.1.b.1  The school-dropout problem 
 
One of the salient problems in the area of education is the share of dropouts (a mirror 
image of the school-enrollment rate) from the education system at various education 
levels. Among young Christians up to the age of 20, the dropout rate from 12 school 
years is 11%. Among the Druze the dropout problem is almost as that among 
Christians and among the Muslims the dropout rates are significantly higher – 20% 
among non-Bedouin Muslims, and about 32% among the Bedouin (Table 2). The 
problem is severe among Bedouin of the non-recognized villages (over 50% dropout 
among 20 year olds and younger). The comparison between dropout rates of people 
aged 44 and older and the dropout rates of 20 year olds and younger indicates a 
substantial improvement over the years. The biggest improvement (94 percentage 
points) was achieved in the reduction of dropout rates at the level of elementary 
school among Bedouin women of the non-recognized villages. This success is 
primarily due to the establishment of elementary schools in a number of these 
villages. On the other hand, the least progress was achieved with respect to dropout 
ratios of Bedouin women for up to 12 years of schooling – only 36%; this is not 
surprising in light of the inadequate number of high schools in these communities. 
The long distance between non-recognized villages and the nearest high school and 
the poor condition of the road-infrastructure certainly make students’ access to 
schools more difficult. Contrarily to that tendency, in recognized Bedouin 
communities there has been a significant improvement with respect to up to 8, 10, and 
12 years of schooling, for women and men alike. Similar conclusions may be found in 
Abu-Saad et al (2007), although their data and indicators are different from ours.
45 
                                                 
45 The source for calculations made by Abu Saad et al is the Ministry of Education, and it reflects a 
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Table 2: School enrollment rates– by population group, gender, and age group 
   













Up to 6  75.4  84.6  83.1  91.8  92.7  93.7 
Up to 8  64.8  75.6  74.8  84.6  85.8  87.7 
Up to 10  44.9  59.6  57.1  66.5  69.6  74.1 
Up to 12  32.2  44.9  42.9  55.5  58.8  63.9 
Men and Women – 20 Years Old and Younger  
Up to 6  96.9  98.5  98.3  99.4  98.4  99.0 
Up to 8  91.0  94.7  94.6  98.3  97.9  98.2 
Up to 10  72.3  89.9  86.2  93.1  95.8  95.6 
Up to 12  47.5  69.6  67.8  80.8  89.4  89.1 
Men and Women – 44 Years Old and Older 
Up to 6  11.5  30.4  28.6  69.3  74.4  82.4 
Up to 8  8.3  14.5  19.3  54.7  62.2  69.6 
Up to 10  4.2  8.3  9.2  28.8  31.9  45.3 
Up to 12  3.5  7.0  6.6  23.0  22.8  34.2 
Men – 20 Years Old and Younger 
Up to 6  97.5  100.0  98.9  99.3  98.5  100.0 
Up to 8  94.8  96.9  96.2  97.9  97.9  99.1 
Up to 10  80.6  95.4  89.5  90.3  97.1  94.8 
Up to 12  54.1  69.1  68.6  71.7  93.3  88.9 
Men – 44 Years Old and Older 
Up to 6  23.8  46.9  45.0  82.2  89.6  89.1 
Up to 8  17.4  24.1  30.7  65.8  81.9  74.8 
Up to 10  9.7  16.1  15.9  36.2  51.0  47.7 
Up to 12   8.1  13.4  12.7  29.7  38.6  38.0 
Women – 20 Years Old and Younger  
Up to 6  96.0  97.1  97.6  99.5  98.2  98.0 
Up to 8  85.8  93.1  92.8  98.7  97.8  97.4 
Up to 10  60.9  85.5  82.7  95.9  94.4  96.4 
Up to 12  38.7  69.9  66.9  90.3  85.9  89.4 
Women – 44 Years Old and Older 
Up to 6  2.0  12.5  13.9  55.6  59.2  76.8 
Up to 8  1.4  4.2  9.0  43.0  42.4  65.2 
Up to 10  0.0  0.0  3.2  21.0  12.6  43.4 
Up to 12  0.0  0.0  1.1  15.8  7.0  31.1 
 
Source of data for calculations: the GS, 2004. The rates are defined as the ratio of school-enrollment of 
persons who successfully completed studying the indicated number of years relative to the potential 
rate for the relevant age group. The potential group for ages 20 and younger in the category of up to 12 
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Table 3: The change in school enrollment-rates between generations by gender 
 














among men (increase (+) in percentage-points), age 20 – compared to age 44+ 
Up to 6  73.7  53.1  53.9  17.1  8.9  10.9 
Up to 8  77.4  72.7 65.5  32.1  16.1  24.3 
Up to 10  71.0  79.3 73.7  54.1 46.1 47.1 
Up to 12  46.0  55.7  55.9  42.0  54.7 50.9 
among women (increase (+) in percentage-points), age 20 – compared to 44+ 
Up to 6  94.1  84.6 83.7  43.9  39.0  21.2 
Up to 8  84.5 88.9  83.9  55.8 55.4 32.2 
Up to 10  60.9  85.5  79.5  74.9  81.8 52.9 
Up to 12  38.7  69.9  65.8  74.5  78.9  58.3 
Gap in study-rates between men and women – between generations (percentage-points) 
The 20 year old and younger age group 
Up to 6  1.5  2.9  1.3  -0.3  0.3  2.0 
Up to 8  8.9  3.8  3.4  -0.8  0.2  1.7 
Up to 10  19.8  9.9 6.9  -5.6  2.7  -1.6 
Up to 12  15.5  -0.7  1.6  -18.5  7.5  -0.6 
The 44 year old and older age group 
Up to 6  21.8  34.4 31.1  26.5  30.4  12.3 
Up to 8  16.0  19.9  21.7  22.8  39.5  9.6 
Up to 10  9.7  16.1  12.7  15.2  38.3  4.2 
Up to 12  8.1  13.4  11.5  13.9  31.6  6.9 
 
A major success in recognized villages is the sharp increase in school enrollment rates 
of up to 10 study years' education. The increase in school enrollment rates of up to 12 
study years' education is also impressive among women – 85.5% and 69.9% 
respectively (Table 3). This advantage in favor of the recognized communities could 
be a meaningful incentive to relocate from a non-recognized to a recognized 
community, particularly so, if, as reported in Abu Saad 1998 and Abu Saad et al., 
2007, Bedouin mothers tend to attach a high value to their children’s education. 
 
The data suggest that the reduction in dropout rates in non-recognized villages may be 
attributed to the government’s investment in elementary and junior high schools in 
non-recognized villages. Were the government to take similar action with respect to 
high schools, we might eventually witness an improvement at that level too. 
 
d.1.b.2  Causes of school-dropout  
 
Adequate infrastructure is crucial to the development of the economy and of the 
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variety of variables, including poverty. The influence on poverty reflects an overall 
effect, with a complex transmission mechanism, given the numerous individual 
decisions that are affected, from education, to health and employment. Such direct and 
indirect components cannot easily be distinguished in an empirical analysis given the 
interactive nature of their effect on poverty and vice versa. 
 
A high dropout rate is observed in the 8
th grade, mostly in the South (Table 4). In this 
section we wish to inquire about the relationship between the dropout-rate and the 
household’s access to public infrastructure. We should keep in mind that the analysis 
of the effect of infrastructure on dropout rates in our data set suffers from a timing 
problem, since access to infrastructure relates to the year of the survey, while the 
dropout rate reflects an extended and variable number of years for each individual. 
 
Table 4: Characteristics of school-dropouts and others (percent)
46 
 Dropouts  Non-dropouts  Dropouts  Non-dropouts 
The entire Arab population  22.8  77.2     
North 16.2 83.8     
Center 37.4  62.6     
 
Area 
South 47.1 52.9     
 All  Arabs  South 
Study-years (average), parents  7.6  9.7  7.2  9.1 
Study-years (average), children  7.8  12.0  7.8  12.0 
Households with electricity net 
access ,% 
86.6 97.4  50.1  71.2 
Households living at least 1 km from 
the nearest bus-stop, % 
34.0 32.7  61.6  48.5 
Households living at least 1 km from 
the nearest public clinic, % 
48.9 38.6  95.4  76.8 
Source of data for calculations: the Galilee society survey, 2004. 
 
Table 5 features three regressions which examine the factors determining dropout 
rates in the Arab population, and especially in non-recognized villages. The relevant 
factors are demographic and also relate to the household’s access to public 
infrastructure. In order to minimize the mentioned timing problem, we refer only to 
dropout observations that occurred in the last three years. Furthermore, in order to 
assure that we are dealing with dropouts only and not with youngsters who are still in 
the process of accumulating human capital, we include only data on individuals aged 
17 or more. The first regression refers to the entire Arab population in Israel. The 
                                                 
46 The dropout rate is defined as the gap between the potential study rate, in which the entire relevant 
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main determinants in this regression are the parents' average study rate, gender, and 
the age of the person who dropped out, as well as a dummy variable for the household 
living in a non-recognized village. In the second regression we added the variable of 
access to public infrastructure. This caused the dummy variable of belonging to a non-
recognized village to be irrelevant.
47 We interpret this result as an indication that the 
inadequacy of infrastructure is more important than some kind of a “cultural” 
argument in explaining the dropout ratio. 
 
Table 5: Determinants of dropping out of school up to high-school level 
 
Regression (1)    (2)    (3)   
Method   LOGIT    LOGIT    LOGIT   




  Dropout dummy¹    Dropout dummy²   
Constant 15.77872  ***  17.01181  ***  25.06756  *** 
The parents' average study rate  -4.477208 ***  -4.179457  ***  -2.523018  * 
Non-recognized Bedouin  0.619915  **  -0.215318    -  - 
Recognized Bedouin, south  0.675368    0.706913    -  - 
Male 0.867336  ***  0.869283  ***  -  - 
Age -0.909316  ***  -0.910699  ***  -1.329547  *** 
Center   1.097895  ***  1.220385  ***  -  - 
Infrastructure index (ten types)  -  -  -0.015607  **  -0.028656  ** 
McFadden R-squared  0.225124  0.230886  0.196379 
Explained variable - mean  0.192254  0.192788  0.451327 
Number of observations  723  721  113 
¹ Regression on the age range of 17-19. 
² Regression on the age range of 17-19, non-recognized Bedouin.  
*, **, *** symbol significance at levels of 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively.  
 
 
d.1.c  Fertility and education 
Fertility constitutes an important factor in establishing the probability to live in 
poverty. The bigger the family size the less are the resources available to each family 
member. The relation between poverty and fertility is complicated and reciprocal (see 
Dasgupta, 1993 and Ravallion, 2005). The relation between poverty and fertility is 
influenced, among other things, by the education the mother accumulated prior to her 
(first) marriage. The regression in table 6 attempts to explain the number of a 
                                                 
47  The extent of access to the various types of infrastructure was set according to the Principal 
Components method in reference to the ten basic types of infrastructure. These include public 
transportation services, connection to the systems of electricity, water, sewage, telephone line, garbage 
disposal, distance from sick funds and from a clinic, the distance from school and access to a 
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woman’s childbirths. Education at the time of marriage appears in the regression with 
high statistical significance. Moreover, standard demographic factors were found to 
affect fertility as expected.
48 We have also found the factor of preference for boys (a 
positive sign for the rate of girls out of all children). 
 
Table 6: Determinants of fertility 
Dependent variable: The number of live childbirths per woman (estimated by OLS method) 
Variable Coefficient 
Constant -5.77*** 
Muslim-Bedouin   1.08*** 
Muslim-Bedouin, non-recognized village  0.83** 
Christian   -1.02*** 
Druze   -0.41*** 
Age 0.62*** 
Age squared  -0.01*** 
School enrollment-rate prior to 1
st marriage  -2.07*** 
Age at first marriage  -0.15*** 
School enrollment-rate, change since 1
st marriage  -2.04 
Divorced before the age of 40 (yes=1, no=0)  -1.06*** 
Widowed before the age of 40 (yes=1, no=0)   -1.38*** 
Share of girls out of total number of children  0.35*** 
R² = 0.5415, adjusted R² = 0.5392, n = 2187 
§ The school-enrollment rate is calculated as the ratio of the years of study completed relative to the 
potential years of study in the relevant age group. 
*, **, *** Symbol for significance at levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.     
 
 
d.2 The  public  perspective 
One of the main functions the State is expected to provide is adequate infrastructure 
for its citizens – basic infrastructure such as water, electricity, sewage system, garbage 
disposal, public transportation, as well as a higher level of infrastructure in a civilized 
society, related to health, education, and culture. The importance of public investment 
in infrastructure to the household can be ranked  by the household’s ability to 
substitute for its inadequacy. The degree of substitutability may be reflected by the 
ability and the cost incurred by the household when accessing a given service 
independently, when the public infrastructure is lacking. For example, while there is a 
very high cost involved in the private substitution of an inexistent road, since building 
the road is complicated and expensive, requiring also official permits etc.. Hence, the 
private and social loss involved in the lack or inadequacy of a road is particularly 
                                                 
48 The age of divorce and the age of becoming widowed were restricted in order to insure that the 
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high. On the other hand the lack of a public transport system is smaller for families 
with higher income, since they can substitute more easily for public transportation. 
For the poor or the disabled its lack will be much more costly, for example lowering 
their chances of finding employment. Investment in basic infrastructure for the Arab 
sector has been neglected for many years. The reasons for this are partly rooted in 
discrimination practiced by the State and public institutions in areas such as water, 
electricity, and transportation, against the Arab population, and in particular, against 
the Bedouin population in non-recognized villages. The problem is further 
complicated by conflict and mismanagement within the local authorities. Furthermore 
the lack and inadequacy of basic infrastructure also reduces private incentives for 
building infrastructure. 
 
d.2.a  Household access to public infrastructure 
Difficulties of accessing basic infrastructure typically characterize very poor 
countries, or remote regions in very big countries. One might thus expect that such 
problems should not occur in a small and advanced country such as Israel. The 
existence of such problems in Bedouin communities thus indicates that discrimination 
might be part of the explanation.
49 Government statistics concerning the distribution 
of investment in infrastructure by regions and communities are not available. We thus 
had to resort to indirect indicators. The present information of the GS is indirect since 
it was gathered by a household questionnaire regarding their access to infrastructure. 
Part of the infrastructure, such as roads and schools are usually provided directly by 
the government, while services of education, welfare, and health, as well as religious 
services are provided by the local authority and the health insurance companies 
respectively, with the financial participation of government. With regard to year 2004, 
government financing should have been more generous for the economically weak 
local authorities (the balance grants). Tal Shahor (2007) examined the collection of 
incomes derived from municipal taxes in Jewish, Arab, and Druze communities while 
accounting for the socio-economic situation of the authorities. He concluded that the 
shortage in incomes derived from municipal taxes in Arab communities was to some 
                                                 
49 Alesina and Glaeser, 2004, find heterogeneity in the population to be an important determinant of 
poverty. They argue that heterogeneity leads to discrimination that arises from the fact that minorities, 
little appreciated by the “mainstream” groups, who are typically better represented in government, will 
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extent due to the residents’ unwillingness to pay taxes, and also because the 
government fulfilled its financing function insufficiently, refusing in part to support 
the economically weak Arab authorities. Convenient access to public transportation is 
crucial for the residents’ successfully integration in employment, as well as for other 
economic and social activity. Transportation infrastructure has three aspects: (1) 
roads, railroads, streets, and inner pathways; (2) the existence of a system that 
connects the inner system to the system of interurban roads and railroads; (3) an 
infrastructure of a network of transportation stations within the community, and from 
the community to other communities, and economic and social centers. The GS 
survey does not afford an opportunity to study all three aspects since the questions 
presented in the survey only inquire about the household’s access to transportation 
services. The possible answers in the survey are: a distance of up to one kilometer; a 
distance of between one kilometer and five kilometers; or a distance of more than 5 
kilometers between a household and the nearest public transportation stop. The 
variable's definition is problematic, since in the recognized and non-recognized 
Bedouin settlements, as well as in many settlements of the North and Center there is 
no public transportation – neither within the settlement nor between settlements in the 
area, and still many of the people sampled noted that public transportation is available 
at a distance of less than one kilometer. In some of the settlements there is no access 
to a main road, or there is no system of roads inside the settlement.  
 
In any case such information thus does not allow for an estimate of the extent of 
investment needed in communities suffering from inadequate infrastructure. 
 
Chart 10 illustrates an index for infrastructure access in the various Arab 
communities. The index's values are based on answers provided by Arab households 
in the GS survey with regard to the population’s access to the infrastructure. The 
access-indicator varies between zero (no access) and 100 (full access). For each 
community, the value of the infrastructure index reflects the average values of the 
index for households in the community, each weighted by household size. 
 
The inadequacy in public transportation infrastructure affects households regressively: 
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family's standard of living, and therefore hurts poor families more strongly. 
Accordingly a reduction in the government’s discrimination in public transportation 
investment could constitute an effective anti-poverty policy. An important problem of 
such discriminatory attitude is that it provides a negative signal to domestic and 
foreign private and corporate investors, which is detrimental for these communities. 
The lack of infrastructure is extremely severe in non-recognized villages in the South 
where the highest score reached by the index is 65 points and the lowest is virtually 
zero (chart 10). In three of the non-recognized villages in the sample the index reaches 
less than 10, and in 8 of them the value is below 20. In the recognized Bedouin 
communities, which are part of the sample, the situation is better – about 80. On the 
other hand, the situation of some of the Bedouin communities of the North is similar 
to that of non-recognized villages of the South. Chart 10 also clarifies that the 
situation cannot be blamed solely on the land-dispute between the Bedouin and the 
State, since the chart shows that inadequate access is a feature common to almost all 
of them, though by varying degree. 
 
Chart 10: Ranking of the Arab communities by access to basic infrastructure 
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Notwithstanding, discrimination is more severe in the South. Furthermore, one should 
keep in mind that the underinvestment in roads and junctions both in the non-
recognized villages and between them and main roads in their vicinity has not been 
included in the GS survey. The various governments over the last years have not only 
been neglecting infrastructure in Arab communities, but there is also a lack of 
transparency concerning statistics about infrastructure. An improved transparency in 
infrastructure statistics for the whole economy is a first and necessary step in order to 
ameliorate inequality in infrastructure and access to it. Furthermore, the government 
does not seem to have any strategy for closing the gap in the Arab sector.
50 The 
"Agenda" document of the Prime Minister's office can testify to that by its disregard 
of the issue of infrastructure.
51 
 
The dropout regression above (Table 5) emphasizes the wide effect, exerted by 
inadequate infrastructure access, such as on school dropout behavior in non-
recognized villages, thus adding to the persistence of poverty through the negative 
effect on future earning capacity. Table 7 indicates that the biggest problem is in the 
area of health: the distance to the nearest public clinic of about 44% of the Arab 
population is more than one kilometer away from home, and for more than 8% of 
them the nearest clinic is more than 5 kilometers away. With regard to about 30% of 
the population the distance to the nearest stop of public transport is more than 1 
kilometer and for nearly 5% the distance is greater than 5 kilometers.  This diminished 
access is even sharper when contemplating the low rate of private vehicle owners: The 
table in Annex 1 reveals that in recognized Bedouin communities, and among the 
other Muslims only 64% own a car. In the non-recognized villages only 45% own a 
private vehicle. Ownership of a commercial vehicle is at a rate lower than 11% 
through all observed population groups. 30% of individuals are more than 1 kilometer 
away from school and about 17% of the observed population is not connected to the 
sewage system. Nearly 20% of the Arab public has to dispose of garbage privately. 
About 32% of the population is not connected to a fixed (Bezeq) telephone line. 
Hence, the biggest problems of accessibility are in the areas of health, transportation, 
                                                 
50 See for example the "Agenda" document which ignores the problem of infrastructure in the Arab 
sector. 
51 It only mentions the "lack of convenient and regular transportation to work places". Moreover, the 
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education, and communication. Among the basic infrastructure, the most difficult 
situation is in the area of sewage and electricity. 
 
Table 7: Problems of Accessibility by  Type of Infrastructure 
The population with accessibility problems 
Total Arab population 
The rate out of the total relevant population (in percent) 
 
 
Type of infrastructure 




 Recognized  Non-
recognized 
Total       
The distance from the clinic closest to 
the place of residence is more than 5 
kilometers 
0.0 65.7  26.5  0.7  6.4  8.2  84,913 
The distance of the public clinic 
closest to the place of residence is 
more than 1 kilometer 
85.0 89.0  86.7  20.8  40.5  43.8  451,265 
The distance of the school from the 
place of residence is more than 1 
kilometer 
28.7 76.9  48.0  11.3  30.4  30.1  310,070 
The distance of the public 
transportation stop is more than 1 
kilometer 
47.5 77.6  59.3  28.4  33.1  35.9  369,825 
The distance of the public 
transportation  stop from the place of 
residence is more than 5 kilometers 
1.9 51.8  22.7  0.0.  5.5  7.0  72,208 
A source other than the Electric Corp. 
for the supply of electricity 
(generator) 
0.0 90.6  36.5  0.0  0.9  5.4  55,191 
Not connected to the sewage system 
(sewage cesspit)  
1.5  99.5 41.0 1.9 15.7  17.1  176,328 
An independent source of water 
supply (other than through Mekorot) 
0.0 40.3  16.3  0.0  0.9  2.8  28,598 
Garbage disposal other than by the 
Authority 
9.6  89.3 41.6 1.2 19.5  19.9  204,903 
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E.  Poverty and the Labor Market 
 
Salient characteristics of behavior in the labor market exhibited by the Arab 
population in Israel are a low rate of women participation in the labor force and a 
high rate of unemployment among them. There is quite an extensive literature 
concerning the participation of Arab men and women in the labor force. A summary 
of major papers on the topic and reference thereto, as well as a discussion on 
employment and poverty can be found in Flug and (Kaliner) Kassir (2001). For more 
recent papers see Fichtelberg (2004), Saban (2006), and G’abarin (2007). These 
papers however do not touch on the infrastructure, which is dealt with in our analysis. 
The obvious candidates for explaining the phenomenon include the lack of 
employment opportunities, the large number of children, a low level of education, 
lack of convenient public transportation infrastructure to enable access to 
employment opportunities in nearby Jewish areas, lack of day care centers for 
children, tradition, and so forth. The situation in the Bedouin communities, especially 
in non-recognized villages is worse than in the rest of the Arab society, most 
probably due to inadequate infrastructure services, which imply low expected rates of 
return on private investment.  
 
These disadvantages are less felt in recognized Bedouin communities. However there 
remains a lack of work places. Particularly for women, employment opportunities are 
limited to the education system and social services. The main outlook for women 
with a high-school diploma, a non-academic post-high-school education or academic 
education is in teaching, typically at elementary school. For low-educated women 
work opportunities are hard to find. Some opportunities available to women in these 
communities are in social and health services, though they require academic 
education, which is in short supply. Indeed, the rates of participation and employment 
of women with academic or non-academic post high-school education are very high. 
Small businesses in the Bedouin communities are typically owned by the family and 
the job opportunities are occupied by the men in the family. Hence, also in these 
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The highest rate of labor force participation among women is in the Center of Israel, 
with a participation rate of 27%. In the North it is somewhat lower (23.4%), while in 
the South the average participation rate is at a very low rate - 9%. These differences 
can be attributed to various factors such as education, demographic traits, the type of 
community and employment opportunities, physical condition, and children at home. 
Christian women have the highest participation rate, about 38%, followed by Muslim 
women (mainly in the Center), and Druze women with about 23% participation. The 
cultural-religious aspect certainly plays an important part, though one of the 
important insights to be gained from the logistic regression model (see below) is to 
elicit the impact of standard labor market variables, the influence of which is often 
blurred by the cultural-religious presentation, since some of the factors might be 
interrelated. A good example is the interdependence between the cultural-religious 
aspect, the heterogeneity argument mentioned above and discrimination in 
infrastructure access. Furthermore, the rate of labor force participation of Muslim 
women in the Center of Israel is nearly four times higher than that of Muslim women 
in the South. Their education, which on average is higher than that of the Southern 
women, explains at least part of their relative success in employment. 
 
Table 8: Indicators for the Arab Labor Market in Israel in 2004 (in percent) 
  North Center  South 





Men and women 
Labor force participation¹  43.9  49.7 40.5  44.2 47.1  31.4  33.4  32.2 
Employment¹ 38.8  44.2  35.4 39.1  44.4  25.2  25.6  25.4 
Unemployment² 11.6  11.0  12.6  11.6  5.9  19.6  23.4 21.1 
Men 
Labor force participation¹  64.5  62.5 57.3  63.4 66.9  54.5  56.5  55.5 
Employment¹ 58.1  56.1  52.3  57.1  63.6  43.1  43.2  43.2 
Unemployment² 10.0  10.3  8.7  9.9  4.9 20.9  23.6 22.0 
Women 
Labor force participation¹  22.4  38.2 23.1  24.6 25.9  10.0  6.8  8.8 
Employment¹ 18.7  33.6  17.9  20.6  23.7  8.7  5.4 7.4 
Unemployment² 16.4  11.9  22.5  16.2  8.5 13.1  21.2 15.4 
¹Employed + unemployed as a share of the working age population (people aged 15 and older). 
²Non-working people who are actively looking for work, as a share of the labor force. Labor force = Unemployed+Employed 
The source of data for calculations: GS, 2004.  
 
The logistic probability model featured below examines the effect of the various 
factors and their interactions on the probability of women aged 19 years and older to 




Poverty, Education, and Employment in the Arab-Bedouin Society                Suleiman Abu-Bader and Daniel Gottlieb    
39
woman belongs to the labor force, and 0 if not. The variables that affect the woman’s 
probability to participate include personal characteristics such as education, age, 
religion, personal status, and additional demographic variables such as the geographic 
region, an indicator of the physical condition of the household's head, who is typically 
the main provider. We add infrastructure access by use of the composite variable 
described above.    
Age: The squared variable is added because a woman’s desire to work may be non-
linear with an interior maximum. It may reflect the incentive to find a job after the 
desired number of children has been achieved and their age distribution permits the 
mother’s daily absence. At the same time there may be a marginal inclination of a 
decreasing desire to enter the labor market with age. 
Education: The opportunity cost of leisure increases with the level of education. We 
assume that the relevant wage offers are not in the backward bending part of the labor 
supply function. 
Community size: the size of the community reflects urbanization, i.e. we expect 
greater employment opportunities and a higher probability of participating in the labor 
force. In a city, the substitution for home production (e.g. caring for children, 
preparation of food, and cleaning the home) is easier.  
Children at home: the number of children reflects the woman's level of commitment 
to the family. The mother’s inclination to look for a job, mainly at early ages of the 
children, reduces the chances of her participation in the labor force.
52   
Personal status: The data include information on the personal status. A woman can 
be single (includes living with a partner but not married), married, divorced, 
widowed, or separated. The assumption is that a married woman is more committed to 
the home than other women, thus implying a higher probability of participation in the 
labor market of a divorced or widowed woman, possibly also due to the greater 
economic hardship of a single parent mother. 
Infrastructure: It reflects the living standard and the number and variety of 
employment opportunities in the community. Moreover, the state of transportation 
                                                 
52 In the Galilee Society survey there is difficulty to extract the number of children in each age sub-
group of a woman, since it is possible that in one household lives an extended family that includes the 
families of the household's head sons and daughters, or additional wives and children of the 
household's head, a thing that makes it more difficult to identify the children's parents. In the regression 
displayed herein we use a dummy variable that receives the value 1 if the woman had a live childbirth 
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infrastructure points to the degree of mobility between home and potential employers 
outside the community. In a community with poor infrastructure we expect low 
business activity and few caretaking facilities for the children.  
Physical (personal) condition: Two variables are available – chronic disease and 
disability. The estimation results are featured in Table 9. The signs of the coefficients 
of the demographic variables (age, age squared, education, personal status, children at 
home, and the level of urbanization) are in the expected direction and statistically 
significant. The positive influence attributed to the state of public infrastructure is 
particularly interesting, from the point of view of government policy. 
 
Model 1 shows that the participation rate of Bedouin women in the South is 
significantly lower than those of Arab women in other regions, with the remaining 
factors held constant. Model 2 expands model 1 by including the infrastructure 
variable. It is shown that this variable positively contributes to the rate of female 
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Table 9: The Probability of a 19+ Years Old Woman to Participate in the Labor 
Force 
A LOGIT model (the dependent variable = 1 if the woman belongs to the labor market, =0 if not) 
The variable  Model 1  Model 2 
Constant -6.48***  -7.34*** 
Age 0.30***  0.30*** 
Age square  -0.00***  -0.00*** 
Education – none (base group: up to junior high-school education)  -1.50***  -1.41*** 
Education – secondary  0.62***  0.60*** 
Education – post high-school (non-academic)  1.55***  1.53*** 
Academic education  2.74***  2.66*** 
Center region (base group: North)  0.41***  0.34*** 
Community < 5000 persons (base group: 5-15 thousand inhabitants)  -0.17  -0.13 
Post high-school non-academic edu.* recognized Bedouin village  2.60***  2.23*** 
Secondary non-academic edu.* non-recognized Bedouin village  1.73***  1.84*** 
Post high-school non-academic education * Center  -0.97***  -0.99*** 
Education: still in school (post-high-school)  -1.07***  -1.10*** 
Suffers from Illness  -0.67***  -0.66*** 
Disabled -1.08***  -1.08*** 
Married -1.59***  -1.59*** 
Married*secondary education  0.31  0.32 
Married*post high-school non-academic education  1.99***  1.98*** 
Married* academic education  1.68***  1.73*** 
Married*secondary education * city > 15 thousand inhabitants  0.42*  0.42* 
Children below age of one year (yes=1, no=0)  -0.84***  -0.82*** 
South (yes=1, no=0)  -0.71*** -0.36 
The level of the ten-infrastructure index in the community    0.01*** 
    
McFadden R-squared  0.35145  0.35384 
A number of observation with a dependent variable=0  3465  3459 
A number of observation with a dependent variable=1  822  821 
A percent of accurate observations (dependent variable=0)  96.16  96.15 
A percent of accurate observations (dependent variable=1)  50.61  50.55 
A percent of accurate observations (total)  87.43  87.41 
The source of data for calculations: the Galilee Society survey, 2004 
*,**,*** symbols significance at levels of 10,5, and 1, respectively 
 
The introduction of infrastructure into the equation makes the regional variable for the 
South redundant. Therefore the low participation rate in Bedouin communities of the 
South and in the non-recognized villages may largely be explained by the difference 
in infrastructure, suggesting that the phenomenon can be explained by an economic 
policy variable, infrastructure. There is thus no need to refer to the fuzzy concept of 
“culture” or region. This result presents a challenge to the government’s top priority 
goal of increasing employment: the government could achieve this goal simply by a 
drastic reduction of discrimination in the area of the most basic infrastructure. Our 
results suggest that the implications will be important, way beyond the initial impact 
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including child poverty, improve the children’s education, and thus may also reduce 
persistent poverty. Instead, the aggressive cuts in income support for people in 
working age in 2002 and 2003, rather than creating an incentive to work, have raised 
poverty. The regional variable for the center raises participation as expected, whereas 
community size does not add to the explanation. 
 
In a non-linear model (such as the one before us) coefficients cannot be interpreted in 
a straight forward manner as the marginal contribution of a specific variable to the 
probability of participating in the labor force. In order to get a sense of the variable's 
influence on the probability of participating in the labor force, the probability of 
participating in the labor force is graphically represented against a single continuous 
variable, while the probability is calculated at the point of the averages of the other 
continuous variables in the regression, and at certain levels (0 or 1) of the dummy 
variables. This is done in charts 11 and 12 for the probability of a woman to 
participate in the labor force: it is described against the level of infrastructure in her 
community. The probabilities are calculated at the point of the average age of women 
in the sample (38 years old). Chart 11 illustrates the movement of probabilities across 
various levels of education.  
 
We conclude that infrastructure affects the probability of participation positively and 
powerfully. This relation is particularly strong for women with secondary education 
or less. Furthermore we observe that the chances of employment are affected 
particularly strongly by infrastructure between the levels of secondary education and 
post high-school non-academic education (college or teachers seminar for example). 
The importance of infrastructure decreases with the level of education (the slope of 
academic education is lower than that of high school education).  
 
Chart 12 describes the relation between the probability of the woman (with post high-
school non-academic education) to participate in the labor force and infrastructure, 
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considerably below that of an unmarried woman (single, divorced, separated, or 
widowed), especially in communities with low levels of infrastructure.
53  
Both charts were calculated for a single, healthy Northern Arab woman aged on 
average 38 years and living in a community of 5,000 to 15,000 persons. 
 
Chart 11:  
The Effect of Infrastructure on the Probability of Labor Force Participation of 
an Arab woman – by the Level of Education 
 
 
An important conclusion from this illustration is that while for women with no formal 
education the inadequacy of public infrastructure hardly matters, since the slope of the 
probability curve is shown to be not only at a low level but also hardly increasing. 
                                                 
53 The personal status was not even significant at a significance level of 10%. Children to the age of 
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However, even for a relatively low education, such as up to secondary school, the 
chances of employment rise considerably by a constant (of more than 10 percentage 
points). The main point is however that employment chances increase by nearly twice 
as much with the adequacy of infrastructure (the change due to the slope of the curve). 
 
Chart 12: The effect of infrastructure on the probability of an Arab woman to 























A factor often mentioned in relation to the failure of the Arab population in the labor 
market is discrimination. (See Sikkuy reports for 2004, 2005) concerning public 
sector employment. With regard to technologically advanced industries, the reason for 
low participation of highly educated Arabs are also due to the roots of the 
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and success are attributed to the sharp reduction in the demand for defense products, 
both by the Israel Defense Force and by foreign demand, due to geopolitical reasons 
that occurred at the time. This process had caused a large-scale dismissal of highly 
educated professionals from big public sector think tanks in fields of high technology. 
At the same time there was a sharp increase in the demand for knowledge, mainly in 
the area of non-defense communications. This situation was favorable to the 
development of entrepreneurship among the many highly educated unemployed 
during the 1990's (see Justman, 2001). 
 
A number of papers point to the existence of discrimination against Arab workers in 
the Jewish labor market as reflected in lower employment prospects and salaries 
among Arabs as compared to Jews, when personal and professional characteristics are 
held constant. Ruth Klinov (1999) points to the existence of gaps in salaries between 
Arab and Jewish workers in the same occupation and with similar characteristics of 
education, work experience, age, and other factors that influence salaries. Klinov had 
found that in the years 1996 to 1997 salaries in the Jewish labor market were about 
11% higher than comparable ones among Arabs.  
 
Another type of discrimination is found in entrance barriers put before Arab workers 
in certain occupations and sectors. An Arab worker with a given level of education 
may be prevented from engaging in an occupation suitable to the available skills. 
Such a worker may thus be forced to choose work in a less profitable occupation or 
remain unemployed for a longer period than a Jewish colleague. An indication for 
such discrimination is given by the share of Arab academics who are employed in a 
profession that is below their educational achievement. We found that in 2004 this 
share was 17.3% among the general Arab population, 22.5% among men and 9.7% 
among women (Table 10). This phenomenon is mostly absent among women in the 
South. However, we note that the main field of employment for Arab academics in the 
South is in teaching: 74.7% of all employed Bedouin academics work in education. 
Among women the share rises to nearly 100%.   
 
Asali (2006) examined the salary gaps between Jews and Arabs during the period 
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a Jew in 1990 to 77% in 1999 and dropped to 56% in year 2003. Asali then 
decomposed the overall gap into three components – human capital, employment 
segregation and a residual.
54 The residual may be interpreted as an estimate for wage 
discrimination. He found that the gap in salaries had nearly doubled in the period 
1990 to 1999. The component attributed to discrimination had risen from 22.3% in 
1993 to 37.9% in 1999. Beginning in year 2000 the trend was interrupted and the total 
salary gap began to decrease to 40.2% in 2003, about 13% reflecting discrimination. 
 
Table 10: People with Professionally Inadequate Employment (percent) 
Education                      Total  Muslims  Druze         Christians 











Men and Women 
Academic 17.3  2.1  0.0  4.0 15.5  37.2 21.1 
Post high-school  
non-academic 
17.6 4.8  0.0  1.0  21.6  18.0  12.5 
Matriculation 9.6  21.2  0.0  11.2  10.0  9.2  6.8 
Men 
Academic  22.5 2.4  0.0  3.2  20.5  52.5  24.5 
Post high-school  
non-academic 
28.7 7.7  0.0  2.0  33.7  31.2  23.2 
Matriculation 10.7  24.9  0.0  9.5  11.0  11.0  9.7 
Women 
Academic  9.7 0.0  0.0  6.1  7.9  0.0  18.9 
Post high-school  
non-academic 
3.8 0.0  0.0  0.0  6.0  0.0  0.0 
Matriculation 6.1  0.0  0.0  16.1  6.4  3.2  2.7 
With academics, an unsuitable occupation is any occupation not defined as an academic occupation or a freelance 
and technical occupation according to the classification of occupations of the CBS (1994). For people with a post 
high-school non-academic education, an unsuitable occupation is any occupation which is not academic, not a 
freelance and technical occupation, an administrative occupation, or clerical work according to the CBS 
classification. Among matriculation graduates we defined unsuitable work as unskilled work. 
The source of data for calculation: the GS. 
 
The segregation component ,which reflects a preference (or prevalence) of certain 
sectors by Arabs, remained stable throughout the period under review, but its portion 
in the entire gap developed in a direction opposite to the trend of the general salary 
gap. 44% of the salary gap in 2003 can be attributed to segregation in occupation. It 
may indeed be that segregation (i.e. the concentration of Arabs in certain occupations 
and sectors) in itself is influenced by the discrimination against Arabs. According to 
                                                 
54 Segregation reflects a preference of certain sectors. It is thus possible that segregation itself includes 
an element of discrimination by causing a reduction of the range of occupations to which young people 




Poverty, Education, and Employment in the Arab-Bedouin Society                Suleiman Abu-Bader and Daniel Gottlieb    
47
such an interpretation a substantial part of the gap in salary and occupations can be 
attributed to discrimination, in both salary and occupation. Discrimination has 
negative implications on the incentive to invest in human capital, since it causes a 
reduction in the expected rate of return from human capital and thus affects negatively 
the incentive to invest in human capital. It should therefore be of major concern to 
policy makers who believe in the power of the labor market to reduce inequalities. 
Clearly our other results above relating to fertility and young women’s education 
amplify the importance of reduced discrimination importantly, since the implied 
expected reduction in family size from higher investment in human capital is 
reinforcing extrication from poverty. 
 
Lewin-Epstein, Semyonov and Al-Haj (1994) found that occupational inequality 
between Jews and Arabs had grown over time, resulting in an over-representation of 
Arabs in blue collar occupations and in services. Bar-El (1993) notes that the 
significant improvement in education of the Arab labor force is not sufficiently 
reflected in the distribution of occupations among Arabs, since it should have caused 
a more significant weight of occupations with a higher earning potential. According to 
Gera and Cohen (2001), the discrimination in occupations constitutes a major problem 
for Arabs with high skills for technologically oriented jobs. This type of 
discrimination is often related to security problems, given the high share of defense 
oriented jobs. The authors find that this situation negatively affects the incentive of 
Arab students to attain academic degrees and raises the number of mismatched 
employment among highly skilled workers, thus earning salaries below their potential.  
 
A further important reason for low wages among Arab workers is related to the 
government's foreign workers policy: The sharp increase in the number of foreign 
workers in Israel, especially since 1993, combined with a low compliance of 
employers with the labor laws, especially concerning foreign workers, has caused 
downward pressure on Arab workers’ salaries.
55 An additional influence to the 
detriment of Arab workers' employment situation, including the highly skilled, was 
caused by the structural reduction in domestic labor demand in traditional sectors, due 
to the relocation of a large part of unskilled labor-intensive industries to countries 
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with low labor costs, in consequence of which unemployment and exit from the labor 
force among Arab workers increased. 
 
Gera and Cohen (2001) examined the sources for occupational inequality in the Israeli 
labor market between Jews and Arabs. Their findings point to the fact that an Arab 
intellectual’s prospects to find work in an occupation suitable to his education is much 
lower than those of a Jewish worker with similar characteristics. Generally, their 
results point to enhanced integration of the Arab population in the Israeli labor 
market, an integration that, among other things, expresses the change in the 
occupational composition and sector composition of Arab workers. These changes are 
expected to reduce discrimination over time. The trends reflected in rates of 
employment and unemployment and in distribution measures of occupations and 
salaries point to reduced opportunities for Arab workers compared to their Jewish 
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F  An Empirical Examination of the Determinants of Poverty Among Arabs 
 
In recent years a number of researches have examined the probability of a household 
to live in poverty. Obviously, such research is sensitive to the poverty definition that 
is chosen. When using the GS database we employ the NII's relative half-median 
approach, since at this stage the GS database does not allow for alternative poverty 
calculations.
56 We follow common practice by using a logistic functional form to 
represent the probability of a household living in poverty. Such an approach is used 
for example in Kyereme and Thorbecke (1991) who analyze poverty by use of cross-
sectional data for households in Ghana. They use the gap of a household's calories 
consumption from a nutritional-normative level of calories as an indicator of poverty 
and try to explain it by economic, demographic, and geographic variables. Rodriguez 
and Smith (1994) use also a logistic regression for poverty estimation in Costa Rica 
and Coulombe and McKay (1996) adopt a similar approach for Mauritania based on 
household surveys made in year 1990.  
 
The main findings in this literature are (1) a significant negative relation between 
poverty and the level of education of the household head, (2) a positive relation 
between poverty and the dependency ratio or family size, and (3) a positive relation 
between poverty and living in the periphery.
57 (4) The state of employment of the 
household's head, (5) the number of other income earners in the home and (6) the 
occupation of the household's head and (7) gender (household head being a woman) 
were also found to be of relevance.
58 A number of papers explain poverty inter alia by 
(8) the household’s access to basic infrastructure. This was typically examined with 
regard to very poor third world countries.
59  
 
For the Israeli economy, empirical research on poverty has been carried out by 
Shaayo and Vaknin, 2000, who analyzed persistent poverty and by Flug and Kassir, 
                                                 
56 The alternative definitions in section C are all calculated, based on CBS data which allow for the 
calculation of additional poverty measures. However, as mentioned earlier, their disadvantage is that 
the CBS ignores the existence of the Bedouin living in non-recognized villages. 
57 See for example Geda A., Niek de Jong, Mwangi S. Kimenyi, and Germano Mwabu, 2005. 
58 See for example Benhabib Abderrezak, T. Ziani, and S. B.-E. Maliki, 2006. 
59 Respective examples are the papers of Q. T. Wodon, 1998; Datt, Simler, Mukherjee and Dava, 2000, 
as well as Datt G. and Dean Jolliffe, 2005. Many of these researches use the FES definition of poverty 
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2001, who analyzed in particular the role of labor force participation. The situation of 
single mothers was discussed in Flug, Kassir and Meidan, 2005. Silber and Sorin, 
2006, and with Deutsch, 2006, analyzed the issue of dimensions of poverty in a multi-
dimensional view. Gottlieb (2007) analyzed poverty and labor market behavior of 
ultra-orthodox (“Haredi”) Jews in Israel. 
 
f.1   Empirical results 
 
The purpose of our empirical analysis is, among other things, to examine the 
importance of the above mentioned variables, typically used for explaining poverty. 
More specifically we include age and age-squared
60 of the head of the household, 
geographic area she is living in, her education, trade and gender, the number of 
income earners, and for the first time, at least in the Israeli context, we add the 
household’s access to infrastructure as an explanatory variable. 
 
Empirical results are presented in Table 11. The second model expands the first 
(which resembles the standard models found in the literature) by adding a variable of 
households' accessibility to infrastructure.
61  
 
Our findings show that the chances of a household to be poor fall with age. The 
coefficient of age squared, though negative, as expected, is not statistically significant 
at the level of 10%.
62   
 
Unsurprisingly, family size significantly raises the probability of living in poverty 
(Chart 13). Family size affects the probability of being poor both directly and 
indirectly: the direct effect is due to the fact that a given income is divided among a 
higher number of people the larger the household size.  The indirect effect is due to 
the interaction between family size and the supply of working hours of the household 
as a whole, either due to the need to take care of the small children or elderly parents 
living in the household.  
                                                 
60 This is often done to account for the nonlinearity in the age variable. 
61 Variables with a significance level above 10%, except for the Area- variable, were omitted from the 
Table. 
62 Such a result, which is consistent with the life-cycle hypothesis, was significant in part of the 
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The head of the household being female was also found to be significant. This result 
reflects in particular the economic pressure on single mothers, being the single 
potential or actual adult provider. Possibly this might also reflect discrimination in the 
labor market against women, either through a negative premium on the wage or 
through a higher probability of involuntary part time work.
63 However, we did check 
whether this result interacted with the type of occupation and the level of education of 
the head of the household. We found that it was not affected by them.  
The level of education (years of schooling) was found to be a highly significant 
explanatory variable of the probability of poverty. Notwithstanding, illiteracy (zero 
years of study) in contrast to a small number of school years (1 to 8 years) was not 
found to add to the explanatory power of the regression. This finding fits the fact that 
those employed with up to 9-10 years of schooling typically work in low-paid jobs for 
the unskilled, and due to other reasons described above they may even face workers 
with higher education competing for jobs, suitable for unskilled workers.  
 
Secondary education significantly helps to reduce the chances of poverty. Post high-
school education helps more than secondary education, and academic education 
importantly reduces the chances of being poor.     
 
The triangular relationship between the level of education, the occupation of the head 
of the household and the chances of being employed is salient. Academic education 
yields a very high chance of being employed. Among women the probability exceeds 
90%. Furthermore, academic education provides a higher earnings potential even 
when the employment is in a job requiring lower skills, probably reflecting the lack of 
opportunities for above average skills.     
 
The number of income earners in the household is found to be a significant variable. 
The existence of additional income earners sharply reduces poverty. In Arab 
households there are fewer income earners per capita than in Jewish households, 
mainly reflecting the low employment rate among women. Arab families’ dependency 
ratio is also higher. As mentioned above, gaps in education and professional skills, but 
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also lack in infrastructure and possibly discrimination in the labor market for high-
skilled workers create barriers to an improved integration of Arabs in the labor market 
in Jewish areas. 
 
The occupation of the head of the household constitutes a central factor in 
determining the probability of a household to live in poverty. As expected the chances 
of a family with the head of the household being in a managerial occupation are very 
low. The probability of poverty drops also if the head of the household not only holds 
an academic degree but also works in an academic job. The probability of living in 
poverty increases if the head of the household is employed in industry or construction.     
 
The location of employment is found to influence the probability of living in poverty: 
Employment within the community raises the probability, probably due to the lower 
level of wages within the community than compared to that outside. 
 
As mentioned above in the logistic model the coefficients do not allow for a direct 
interpretation in terms of the marginal contribution of a specific variable to the 
probability in question. An example of such a marginal influence on the probability of 
living in poverty is depicted in chart 13 for the variable of family size, based on the 
regression in table 11. The other variables are held constant at the average of each of 
the other variables in the regression. For binary (“dummy”) variables the level is 
either 0 or 1.  
 
The chart shows that at any given family size the probability of the household to live 
in poverty falls with the level of education. The largest reduction in the probability of 
being poor due to a rise in the level of education occurs in families sized 6 to 8 
persons. The two bottom lines in the chart show the importance of the access to 
infrastructure to poverty reduction: if the access to infrastructure is improved from an 
intermediate level (75 points out of 100) to the top level, the probability of a 
household to be poor drops by some 8 percentage points. This implies an elasticity of  
about one quarter. However this elasticity reflects only a partial effect of the full 
infrastructure effect on poverty, since we showed above that infrastructure will reduce 
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the improved educational achievement among girls will in the medium run translate 
into a lower rate of fertility among women (see discussion above). 
 
Table 11: The Probability of a Household to live in Poverty 
£ - a Logistic Model 
(A Logit model, below the poverty line = 1, above the poverty line = 0) 
The name of the explanatory variable  Model 1  Model 2 
Constant -0.10  0.79** 
Age of the household's head  -0.02***  -0.02*** 
Family size  0.36***  0.36*** 
A household headed by a woman (1 = yes, 0 = no)  0.37**  0.37** 
Secondary education of the household head (1 = yes, 0 = no)  -0.41***  -0.40*** 
Post High-school education of the household head (non-academic) 
(1 = yes, 0 = no) 
-0.90*** -0.87*** 
Academic education of the household head  (1 = yes, 0 = no)  -1.39***  -1.35*** 
One provider in addition to the household head (1 = yes, 0 = no)  -1.12***  -1.10*** 
Two income earners in addition to the household head (1 = yes, 0 = 
no)  
-1.90*** -1.88*** 
A mixed community (1 = yes, 0 = no)  0.31**  0.38** 
Household head employed within the community (1 = yes, 0 = no)  0.34***  0.36*** 
Household head is chronically ill (1 = yes, 0 = no)  1.01***  1.02*** 
The community is located in the Center of Israel (1 = yes, 0 = no)  0.04  0.10 
A non-recognized Bedouin community of the South (1 = yes, 0 = 
no) 
0.39*** -0.20 
A recognized Bedouin community of the South (1 = yes, 0 = no)  -0.18  -0.20 
An academic occupation (1 = yes, 0 = no)  -0.72***  -0.72*** 
A freelance occupation  (1 = yes, 0 = no)  -1.10***  -1.08*** 
A professional occupation (1 = yes, 0 = no)  -1.04***  -1.02*** 
A non-professional occupation (1 = yes, 0 = no)  -1.02***  -1.00*** 
Access to infrastructure (10 types of infrastructure, index 0-100)      --  -0.01*** 
 
McFadden R-squared  0.2612  0.2638 
Number of observations with the dependent variable=0  1644  1642 
Number of observation with the dependent variable=1  1518  1581 
Percent of accurate observations (dependent variable=0)  76.46  77.77 
A percent of accurate forecast (dependent variable=1)  70.75  71.15 
A percent of accurate forecast (total)  73.72  74.59 
The source of data for calculations: the Galilee Society survey, 2004 
£ according to the relative approach of half the median net disposable income.  
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 Chart 13: The Probability of a Household to live in Poverty – by Household Size 
and Household head Education level 
 
Background data: the head of the household is a 46 years old man (the average age) who is employed 
in a professional occupation (exclusive of the third graph from the bottom), a single provider, free of 
illnesses, lives in a community which is not mixed, employed outside the community he lives in, and 
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G Concluding  Remarks 
 
In this paper we examine the socio-economic situation of the Arab-Bedouin 
population of the Negev and compare it to the situation of the rest of the Arab 
population in Israel. The Arab society in Israel is living in economic and social 
conditions that are seriously inferior to those of the Jewish society. The majority of 
Arab communities are rated at the bottom clusters of the socio-economic index 
published by the Central Bureau of Statistics. This situation is strongly reflected in 
poverty data calculated here, using the unique data set of the Galilee Society for the 
year 2004 and using CBS data for analyzing trends. Over the period of nine years, the 
severity of poverty in the Arab society (measured here by the Sen-Index, which 
combines poverty incidence, the income gap, and the Gini coefficient of inequality 
among the poor) registered an upward trend and was on average about three times 
higher than the comparable figure in the Jewish (non-ultra-orthodox) sector. In year 
2004 poverty incidence among persons was 52% and poverty severity according to 
the Sen-Index was more than 4 times that prevailing in the Jewish population. The 
situation is quite similar when using an alternative definition of poverty (FES) which 
may be interpreted as stressing persistent poverty, since it reflects a basic needs 
approach resting solely on data of consumption expenditure.  
 
The database enables for the first time a comprehensive analysis of the socio-
economic situation of the entire Arab-Bedouin population, i.e. including the residents 
in villages not recognized by the state. This population’s situation is particularly harsh 
for both poverty measures, with poverty incidence by the relative (half-median) 
measure reaching nearly 80% in 2004. The severity of poverty among the non-
recognized Bedouin was about 7 times higher than that of the Jewish (non-ultra-
orthodox) population. An empirical analysis of poverty indicates that similar to 
findings from international poverty research, the probability of living in poverty in the 
Arab society is well explained by the standard variables such as gaps in education, the 
age of the head of the household, family size and the low number of income earners. 
A major innovation of this paper is in the quantification of the relevance of access to 
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access to a wide variety of services which are vital for daily functioning. Such basic 
infrastructure barely exists in the non-recognized villages but is also below full access 
in most Arab communities. 
 
The lack of access to infrastructure affects poverty both directly and indirectly: It is 
shown to affect dropout rates from the education system negatively and also worsens 
the chances for employment. The negative effect on educational achievements on girls 
has an additional expansionary effect on fertility in the medium run and thus on 
persistent poverty. These effects raise poverty and perpetuate the dependency of the 
residents on the welfare system. The sharp worsening of the social security net in 
Israel’s social policy in the years 2002-2004 has sharply raised poverty incidence and 
poverty severity in the Arab society. The adverse effect is particularly strong since the 
high rate of child poverty combined with the problems in education infrastructure 
implies that their poverty will eventually become a persistent phenomenon due to the 
effect on the children's future earnings capacity.  
 
The shortage in public transportation infrastructure is particularly regressive, since it 
affects poorer households more strongly than others, given their low rate of ownership 
of private cars. The lack of the government’s resolve to improve infrastructure in 
Arab communities thus create a particular disadvantage among the poor, pushing 
them deeper into poverty and lowering their participation in the labor market. The 
adverse effect of a reduced access to public infrastructure is even greater, since such 
government policy sends a negative signal to domestic and foreign private and 
corporate investors. These results present a challenge to governments which declare 
enhanced labor force participation as their top priority. 
 
A positive aspect found in this study is that the rates of school enrollment (the rate of 
students in proportion to the population at the relevant age) have been improving 
consistently over the generations, especially among women. As a result, the 
educational gap has been reduced both by gender and by age groups.  
 
One might have expected that the urbanization initiated by the government several 




Poverty, Education, and Employment in the Arab-Bedouin Society                Suleiman Abu-Bader and Daniel Gottlieb    
57
employment opportunities, particularly in other than the traditional sectors. However, 
the insufficient access to basic public infrastructure has created a significant barrier to 
the labor force participation of women and had thus worsened poverty and its outlook. 
The weak state of infrastructure was found to have had negative influences on dropout 
rates from the schools. Also found was an indirect influence of the accessibility to 
infrastructure on fertility, since the influence of dropping out from school reduces the 
well know influence of female premarital education on fertility, thus reducing the 
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The average number of 
individuals per room 
1.21 1.61 1.03  1.05 1.53  1.80  1.64  1.55 
The average number of 
rooms in a residential unit 
4.03 4.05 3.83  4.41 4.31  3.52  4.15  4.61 
Household title over a residential unit or tenancy 
Title 91.7  95.9  81.4  98.8  94.4  98.8  95.1  92.4 
Tenancy 8.3  4.1  18.6  1.2  5.6  1.2  4.9  7.6 
The rate of households 
that require at least one 
residential unit in the next 
10 years 
59.2 71.5  57.3 53.2  72.3  70.0 72.8  74.8 
The rate of households 
which are incapable of 
supplying at least one 
residential unit of those 
required in the next 10 
years 
26.3 30.5  22.7 23.8  25.5  40.8 27.8  18.5 
The type of accommodation  
Villa 7.2  5.6  5.3  10.8  7.9  0.9  3.3  5.0 
House 65.9  64.0  41.5  68.7  75.8  39.8  65.4  84.0 
An apartment in a 
building 
26.4 5.6 53.2  20.5  8.3  0.2  4.0  6.7 
A separate room  0.3  0.2  NA  NA  NA  0.5  0.2  NA 
A tent  NA  0.1  NA  NA  NA  0.4  0.1  NA 
A shack  0.1  22.2  NA  NA  7.8  51.8  24.2  4.2 
Other 0.0  2.3  NA  NA  0.3  6.5  2.7  NA 
Connection to public infrastructure  
Water infrastructure 
(Mekorot Corp.)  




(the electric network) 





88.4 54.3 99.2  88.4 80.3  0.7  57.3  98.3 
Sewage infrastructure 
(cesspit) 
11.2  42.1  0.8  10.9  19.4, 0.3³  88.7, 10.6³  38.2, 
4.4³ 
1.7 
Telephone line  74.6  21.3  89.9  88.4  31.3  0.7  11.5  19.3 
At least one computer at 
home 
49.9 23.9 56.9  57.4 30.3  10.7  21.6  29.4 
Internet service at home  23.8  5.3  45.4  25.2  7.8  0.2  4.5  7.6 
Playground or public 
park in the area  
17.3 2.0 30.5  12.8 2.8  0.4  2.1  3.4 
Title over a car, library 
A private car  64.2  56.0  63.6 75.4  61.4  44.7  55.8  63.9 
A commercial car  9.2  5.7  11.4  8.4  5.5  6.0  6.4  6.7 





















Relocation, confiscation, and demolitions 
The rate of people 
relocated from their  
original place of residence 
in Israel 
16.5 17.9  14.5  0.1  20.7  11.6  22.7  30.5 
Confiscation of property 
since 1947  
22.6 32.4  18.6  27.2  29.3  38.7  37.2  36.1 
Demolition of buildings in 
the recent 12 month 
0.1 1.7  NA NA  0.6  4.0  2.2  0.8 
The number of 
demolitions 
161 604  NA  NA  139  465  604  139 
The rate of demolitions 
out of the total number of 
residential units' owners in 
the sector 
0.2 1.9  NA NA  0.7  3.9  2.3  1.0 
Kinship between married women and their husbands 
First degree kinship  20.4  34.1  11.4 28.5  31.8  39.3  37.4  35.7 
Other degree of kinship 
from the same clan 
15.8 27.4  7.2  13.5  25.3  32.8  26.9  23.2 
Comments:                
¹special connections  ²A 
genera
tor 
³None            
Household Families    p  
Details 
           
Source of data: the GALILEE SOCIETY survey 
 
 
   
תיצמת  
יתרבחה הבצמ תא  חוב הז רמאמ   ייסולכואה לש ילכלכ ה תיברעה      האוושהב בגנב תיאודב
ייסולכואה ללכ לש הבצמל ה  ראב תיברעה   . היילעב איה ינועה ידממ תמגמ  ורחאה רושעב  .  תנשב
2004   ייסולכואה לש תוינעה תושפנה רועיש ה תיברעה     תיאודב  היה 52%  ,   ילבוס  המ שילש ינשכ
תמ ינועמ  שמ  .  
 
 תנשמ לילגה תדוגא לש ידוחיי  ינותנ רגאמ תוכזב 2004  ברקב דחוימב רומח בצמהש  ידמול ונא 
ייסולכואה ה תיברעה    אלה  יבושייב תיאודב    ירכומ  ,  טעמכ התיה ינועה תלוחת  ש 80% ב   
2004 תילארשיה הרבחב ינועה תלוחתמ העבש יפ  רעב הרומח איהו    תידוהי  .  עדימ רגאמ  הז
שארל רשפאמ מ תא קודבל הנו בצ הייסולכואה לש ינועה  תיברעה    תיאודב   ה ב היח י י יבוש אלה    
 ירכומ  .   תויתשתל תיברעה הייסולכואה לש תושיגנה תעפשה לע דומלל  ג רשפאמ רגאמה
תויסיסב תוירוביצ  , תירוביצ הרובחת ומכ  , למשחה תוכרעמ  , בויבהו  ימה  ,  הפשאה קוליס יתוריש
ואירב לש תוירוביצ תויתשת  כו  וניחו ת  .  
 
 היניב  ירשקה תאו ינועל  ימרוגה תא  יקדוב ונא וז הדובעב  .   יימואלניב ינוע ירקחמ ומכ
  ייתחפשמו  יישיא  ינייפאמש  ידמלמ ונלש  יאצממה  ג  ירחא – הלכשה  וגכ   , ליג  ,
תיבה קשמ שאר לש דיה חלשמו הקוסעתה  ,  החפשמב  יפסונה  יסנרפמה רפסמו החפשמה לדוג
– נתשמ  ה  ינועב תויחל תיברע החפשמ לש תורבתסהה רבסהב  יבושח  י  .  אצמנ  וניחה  וחתב
 הדימלה ירועישב רכינו דימתמ רופיש לש  ילהת לח יכ )   ידמולל תיסחי לעופב  ידמולה רועיש
תצובקב  יילאיצנטופה המיאתמה ליגה   (  ימדוק תורודל האוושהב  ,  ישנ ברקב דוחייב  .   כיפל
 ישנה תבוטל  ישנל  ירבג  יב הדימלה ירועישב  ירעפב  וצמצ לח  .  יכ ונאצמ תויתשתה  וחתב
ילארשיה קשמה ומכ חתופמ קשמ תמלוה אלש המרב  תקפסאב שממ לש הילפא שי  .  תושיגנ
לשו ללכב תיברעה הייסולכואה לש תויתשתל אלה  יבושייב  יאודבה     הכ איה טרפב  ירכומ
הקוסעתהו הדובעה חוכב  ישנ תופתתשה ינפב דבכ  סח הדימעמ איהש הכומנ  ,  תא הניטקמ  כלו
תיבה קשמב  יסנרפמה רפסמ  .  תמלשה לע תוילילש תועפשה  ג ואצמנ דוריה תויתשתה בצמל
רפסה יתבב  ידומילה  . ע הפיקע העפשה  ג שי הכומנ תויתשת תמרל   יבש רשקה  רד הדוליה ל
הדוליל השאה תלכשה  .  תיבויחה העפשהה  ונמ תא  צעב הנתימ ישונאה  והב העקשהב העיגפה
ינועה לע השאה תלכשהל תויהל הלכיש  .   יבר  יברע  יאמדקא  לש הקוסעתהש אוה  סונ אצממ
 הירושיכ תא תמאות הניא  , יתקוסעת לודיב הילפא ללגב הארנכ  . ה לש תישממ תוברעתה  הלשממ
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בגנב ירוזא חותיפו רקחמ זכרמו ןוירוג וב תטיסרבינוא ,הלכלכל הקלחמה .1
 .ןונכתהו רקחמה להנימ ,ימואל חוטיבל דסומה .2
 .הז רקחמב הברה םתרזע לע יקסבונ'צק לארשילו ןמורפ סכלאל תדחוימ הדות
 רבליס ק'זל ,ןרק-ובא ראמעלו לייזוהלא רמאעל ,דעס-ובא ליאמסיאל םידומ םג ונא
  .תוליעומה םהיתורעה לע ארג סיסמרלו
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